Electoral systems and clientelism

That title could be the title of a book, or a multi-volume collection. This is a big topic. The purpose here will be more modest than the title implies. I want to sketch the basic logic of how electoral systems can generate incentives for “clientelism.” I responded already to an excellent question in the thread on proposed electoral reform in Malta. In the editorial that I quoted in part, it is claimed that the use of the single transferable vote (STV) in Malta has led to clientelistic behavior by which politicians “rely on dishing out favours to secure their seats.” The money quote on why the electoral system promotes this behavior would be the following:

The STV system, while aiming to provide representation to diverse political views, has led to fierce competition among candidates from the same party within a single district. This unhealthy competition often results in politicians prioritising convincing voters not to vote for their internal rivals rather than engaging with people from opposing parties.

Christopher asked, “Is there a particular tendency towards clientelism in STV and SNTV¹ that is not present in open list PR?” This is a great question. I answered it in that comment thread, but I felt it deserved its own dedicated planting, as well as further elaboration on the broader issue.

First, let’s consider a working definition of clientelism. It is, very broadly, the exchange of favors for political support. Not mere campaign promises, and not routine casework (like a legislator helping a constituent navigate the bureaucracy). But actual delivery of favors as a quid-pro-quo for the vote. It is most prevalent when vote choices can actually be observed, but such monitoring is not required. Parties or candidates can have other means of knowing which voters are likely to be loyal, and direct favors to them without actually validating how they voted. (They typically can validate that they voted, and have other good information on their political allegiances.)

Clientelism is also not “pork barrel” politics. “Pork” is local public goods, such as a road or train station or a military base (etc.) being located in a constituency as a reward for its voters being politically loyal to the party or legislator. Pork is not mainly directed at specific voters or narrow groups of voters. These two concepts can shade into one another, however, without a sharp dividing line between them. Nonetheless, they are conceptually distinct.

The most pernicious forms of clientelism are those that involve the subversion of public services. Suppose there is some entitlement program such that anyone who meets program criteria should get it (a health or childcare benefit or an electrical grid connection to your house, for example). Yet in practice, only those who prove their political loyalty actually get the benefit. If the local clientelistic “boss” does not vouch for you, too bad. No service for you. The “boss” could be a local party worker, a government official who is part of the clientelistic network (and a patronage appointee rather than one hired principally on merit), or even our legislator.

There are other, more “petty,” forms of clientelism, such as legislators showing up to weddings and funerals and bringing gifts as a means to cement political loyalties. These practices cost money, which may be raised through unregulated donations from business or via outright corruption,² although they may also be financed through more legitimate campaign contributions. But they do not undermine public services like the first kind I mentioned. Basically, clientelism takes many forms, and some may be very harmful to effective governance and some not so much.

There are also practices to cultivate a “personal vote”³ that are not clientelism at all. Candidates emphasizing how their own attributes–like being locally based, being of a certain occupation or other experience, etc.–will make them better representatives than their competitors are not clientelism because nothing of intrinsic value is being exchanged.⁴ 

Having laid out these broad definitions and boundaries of the concept, let’s turn to what the electoral system may have to do with it. Back to Christopher’s question–is there a particular tendency towards clientelism in STV and SNTV that is not present in open list PR? On theoretical grounds, the answer to the question is yes.

An inability, given electoral rules, of parties to maximize their seats without engaging in vote management is what makes it critical to give voters a reason to favor one candidate of the party over another. Clientelism is one–but only one–means of managing the vote, by which here I mainly mean attempting to ensure each candidate the party seeks to elect has the personal vote totals needed to earn a seat. Any number of personal vote-enhancing tactics or attributes might work, but the advantage (to the party) of using clientelistic practices is that it gives voters a clearer incentive to vote for the “correct” candidate because that is the individual who got you, the voter, the favors.⁵ (Vote management also may take place at the candidate selection stage,⁶ but I will mostly leave that aside here.)

The imperative to engage in vote management is most acute under SNTV, somewhat less under STV, and theoretically a non-factor under OLPR. With SNTV, by definition the winners are the candidates with the M highest individual vote totals in the district, where M is the magnitude of the district (the number elected from it). Because there is only a single vote and it does not transfer (no ranked preferences) or pool (no party-level aggregation before seats are assigned), the party can win its target number of seats only by having that number of candidates within the top M. If it has too many candidates, or too many votes concentrated on its most popular candidate, it may fail to elect the number it is seeking to elect, with other candidates falling out of the top M. With STV, the vote transferring should limit this problem, but it does not necessarily eliminate it. If a party has some of the candidates it is hoping to elect get eliminated early in the count, the party will fail to elect all that they could have if only those candidates had stayed in the count long enough to pick up transferred preferences from more popular co-partisans or from eliminated candidates of their own or other parties. This is especially a problem if voters load a lot of their first preferences on one candidate (similar to one of the key problems in SNTV), and if they do not rank all available candidates of the same party before ranking candidates of other parties. (Failure to keep preferences within the party is known as “vote leakage.”)

Why, then, is the vote-management imperative that may drive clientelism a non-factor under open lists, at least theoretically? Because vote pooling at party-list level means the party won’t displace seats to another party by failing to have an optimal distribution of votes among its candidates. A list wins some number of seats, which we will denote as s, based on its collective vote total. It does not matter if some of the party’s s candidates with the top individual vote totals do not place in the district’s top M overall. It will always elect s, the number its pooled vote total entitled it to, as long as it has at least that many candidates on the list.

There can be other reasons why the party might care which candidates win, however, which means there can still be party-driven clientelistic strategies, or other vote-management practices, under OLPR. That is, while parties have incentive to nominate a full list of candidates to collect votes that pool for seat-maximization, maybe they really want to ensure the election of some specific candidates.⁷ So the clientelistic way to do this is give them access to resources to ensure their own election. (Again, there may be ways to promote a division of the vote that is optimal from the party’s perspective without using clientelism.)

That is the theory.⁸ When we turn to empirics, it gets murkier. 

An important point here is that clientelism usually is not caused by the electoral system. Clientelism can occur under any electoral system, and in authoritarian as well as democratic systems. It has many roots aside from institutions.⁹ It just takes different forms under different institutions. In theory, closed-list PR should be the electoral system least conducive to clientelism. CLPR should encourage campaigns centered around policy and programmatic offerings to voters, because voters select the party as a whole and thus candidates are not pitted against one another in their quest for a seat. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that parties as a whole can engage in clientelism. There are closed-list systems that are famous for it, such as Argentina¹⁰ and Venezuela (prior to the adoption of MMP in 1993, but clientelism certainly continued afterwards). This is a different form of clientelism, in that it is obviously not being used as a strategy to divide the vote within a party, as it would be under SNTV, STV, or potentially OLPR. But if you are a citizen who is unable to get a public service without having proven you have the “correct” political allegiance, you do not really care how the electoral system might be, or might not be, responsible for your predicament.

Returning to the prevalence of clientelism under systems with intra-party competition, we might note that Brazilian politics is clientelistic under OLPR, but Finnish politics is individualistic without being clientelistic despite also using OLPR. Maltese politics is clientelistic under STV, Irish much less so. (Ireland is famous for the localism of its politics and for “friends and family” voting, but I don’t think of that system as clientelistic–but see exchange with Ken in the comments.) Taiwan probably had less clientelism than Japan⁹ under SNTV and both surely had far less than Colombia, which used a system that was basically SNTV prior to 2003. 

Malta, as we were discussing at the other planting, has clientelism with STV despite a very party-oriented electorate. That suggests it is probably not vote-management, as I defined it above, that is driving the clientelism. So maybe STV is not driving it, either, but I do not know enough about Maltese politics to make such a judgment. It would be important to nail down the logic of clientelism in Malta before recommending an electoral reform. If it is more party-level clientelism, then closed-list PR will not help. The quote from the editorial (see above or the earlier post) certainly implies it is candidate-based, however.¹¹ [This footnote is actually no. 12 in list below.]

In sum, clientelism is the exchange of favors to individual voters or small groups of people in return for political allegiance, including votes. Such practices should be kept distinct from other means of campaigning on benefits other than those derived from programmatic policies, such as “pork” and are distinct from the personal vote. However, in systems that promote a personal vote via intra-party competition, parties may engage in various tactics of vote-management in order to maximize seats. Vote management may involve clientelism, although it does not inevitably do so. Clientelism can occur under any electoral system, but systems that promote vote management can be expected to encourage clientelism to a greater degree than other systems, all else equal. Open-list PR, because it does not usually tie party seat maximization to vote management, should not promote clientelism to the same substantial degree as SNTV does. STV should fall closer to SNTV than to OLPR in its clientelistic tendencies. Other factors matter; it would be a big mistake to think that the electoral system determines whether or not there is clientelism, but it may encourage it to take certain forms or be worse, in a given context, than would be the case with a different electoral system.

Footnotes. [Sometimes the numbering of these by Word Press goes awry.]

1. Single non-transferable vote. ↩︎
2. Perhaps because I mentioned it, I also have to define corruption. I hesitate to do so, but it is important to note that something is not corrupt just because it looks bad, and pork barrel is not per se corruption. A practice is corrupt if it involves illegal use of public resources, such as providing services only with direct payment (bribes), awarding public contracts to political supporters outside of regular bidding processes, or raising campaign funds illegally. ↩︎
3. A personal vote is that portion of a candidate’s vote that derives from his or her attributes or experience, as distinct from votes earned via the candidate’s party label. The classic definition is from Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987). ↩︎
4. Engaging in casework, providing clientelism, and having a reputation for delivering pork all may be ways to build a personal vote. But a personal vote need not be built on any of these strategies. It could be as simple as voters liking the candidate who is of their ethnic group, resides in their area, is a celebrity (i.e., famous before entering politics), or whose personal integrity they admire. ↩︎
5. Incentives can be aligned in other ways, such as through party personnel practices. Examples include assigning legislators who will serve as conduits of regulatory and other favors on behalf of particular business interests to specific legislative (or internal party) committees where they can credibly claim to have lobbied their party or the government on behalf of the interest. This is not necessarily clientelism (or pork), but it may be, and certainly was in Japan under SNTV. ↩︎
6. For instance, by nominating/endorsing only as many candidates as the party perceives as optimal in a system without party-level vote pooling (like SNTV), or by ensuring a set of candidates with an appropriate mix of personal vote-earning attributes that will appeal to sub-constituencies within the district. ↩︎
7. This imperative becomes even greater if the list is comprised of an alliance of two or more parties. In that case, the component parties obviously are not indifferent as to which specific candidates win the seats the list obtains. This provides a strong SNTV-style dynamic to the competition. Alliance lists are common in the open-list systems of Brazil, Chile, and Finland. Chapter 14 of Votes from Seats deals extensively with this matter. Even a single party may have a collective interest in ensuring some specific candidates on its list get elected, perhaps for the “party personnel” reasons mentioned in an earlier footnote (i.e., wanting personnel with certain experience to serve as policy specialists on behalf of key constituencies). ↩︎
8. These theoretical points are advanced in more detail in chapters 13 and 14 of Votes from Seats, and also in my article with Bergman and Watt. Both also are empirical works, but the outcome of interest is the number of party-endorsed candidates and their vote shares, not clientelism or personal-vote earning strategies. On the theory, see also Carey and Shugart (1995). ↩︎
9. The most obvious roots would be economic, particularly uneven development. Richer and less unequal countries undoubtedly have less clientelism–at least of the “pernicious” forms. State capacity is also a big one, but the arrows can point both ways. Low state capacity creates more demand for clientelism to fill in gaps in public services, but clientelism creates vested political interests against building state agencies empowered to deliver services to the broader public without the quid-pro-quo. Ethnically divided societies also tend to be especially conductive to clientelistic strategies, mostly because ethnic affinity provides a “shortcut” to determining which parties or candidates are credible as service-providers to your group (see Chandra 2004). There are vast literatures on these points, which I will not attempt to review or synthesize here. ↩︎
10. On Argentina, and for an excellent overview of how clientelism works generally, see Auyero (2000). ↩︎
11. [Footnote marker no. 9, re Japan.] Most of the clientelism in Japan was of the more “petty” kind I referred to above. Campaigns were famously expensive and this fueled corruption. Personal vote and pork barrel were prevalent, as well, but not (as far as I know) the kind of subversion of public services that I think of as the most pernicious manifestations of clientelism. ↩︎
12. I struggle to some degree with understanding the full logic of this claim regarding Malta, however. With transferable votes, the reason for vote-management should be mainly driven by concerns of “vote leakage” whereby transfers do not stay within the party of the first-preference candidate. However, in Malta there is hardly any leakage; few votes transfer from one party to another (see the source cited in the post on Malta). In this context, personal-vote practices, whether clientelistic or otherwise, are not needed to maximize seats. It should be, in practice, more like what I said about open lists. I am certainly in no position to resolve this puzzle. ↩︎

2023 Swiss election: minor technical problem leads to major embarrassment

Like most European countries, Switzerland uses proportional representation (PR) to choose members of the National Council, the lower house of the country’s federal legislature. However, the Swiss system has distinctive characteristics which require a special procedure to determine the nationwide party percentage shares, and a minor technical problem during the federal election held last Sunday, October 22 resulted in the calculation of erroneous nationwide party percentages figures, which remained undetected for nearly two days. Although the Swiss government issued corrected figures on Wednesday, October 25, the unfortunate incident has become a major embarrassment for a country which prides itself on precision. In this posting we review the procedure used in Switzerland to determine nationwide party percentages in federal elections, as well as the technical issue that generated the erroneous figures and the steps that could or ought to have been taken to prevent its occurrence.

In elections to the 200-seat Swiss National Council voters in twenty multi-seat cantons have as many votes as there are seats to be filled; in 2023 that figure ranged from a minimum of two to a maximum of thirty-six. In these cantons, voters can select a single list, thus voting for every candidate on it, but they can also drop a candidate from the list, and either put another candidate from the same list a second time and cast an additional vote for that candidate (a procedure known as cumulation), or write in the name of a candidate from another list (a practice known in French as panachage). Moreover, voters can also compose their own lists by combining candidates from different lists.

Meanwhile, the remaining six cantons have one seat each, filled by plurality voting, with voters choosing a single candidate. Since adding up the canton-level results to obtain nationwide totals for each party would result in skewed figures, due to the disproportionate weight of the vote totals in the larger cantons, it is necessary to convert the results from the multi-seat cantons to comparable values on a nationwide basis.

One alternative would be to divide the votes obtained by each party in a multi-seat canton by the corresponding number of National Council seats to be filled. However, due to the incidence of under-voting – some Swiss voters choose fewer candidates than the number of cantonal seats – the sum of comparable values for all parties would be smaller than the number of valid ballots. Instead, in each canton Switzerland’s Federal Statistical Office (FSO) divides the number of votes obtained by each party by the total number of valid votes, and then multiplies it by the number of valid ballots, so that the sum of comparable values for all parties will be equal to the number of valid ballots. Then, the canton-level comparable values for each party are added up to obtain nationwide totals, and the corresponding party percentage shares are calculated by dividing each party’s nationwide comparable value total by the total number of valid ballots.

By the way, FSO calls the comparable values “fictitious voters” – an incredibly unfortunate term in an era of rising skepticism about the transparency of election processes, and all the more so in light of the incident addressed here.

At any rate, the procedure utilized by FSO delivers modestly inflated comparable values at the expense of under-voting (whose incidence in Swiss federal elections is fairly low), and which also vary slightly when calculated at different geographical levels, precisely because of under-voting percentage variations. More importantly, it contributed directly to the erroneous calculations, because it depends on accurate valid ballot totals. As it was, according to FSO an undetected data import glitch triggered by a programming error caused voter turnout data records for the single-seat cantons of Glarus, Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden – which deliver their election data in a non-standard format – to show up multiple times, thus inflating turnout statistics for these cantons by a factor of three to five, including the crucial valid ballots statistic. Moreover, the faulty data import routine wasn’t even tested with previous election results before being used on election night.

(Specifically, the affected cantons’ commune-level records in the CSV-format turnout data file were repeated three to five times; the canton-level records showed up once, but with values inflated by the number of times the commune-level records were repeated. However, this problem did not occur with the corresponding records in the party votes CSV data file, where only the parties’ comparable values in the three affected cantons were inflated.)

Normally, the comparable values for parties in single-seat cantons are equal to the number of votes polled by their respective candidates in those cantons, since voters in such cantons can only vote for one candidate, and therefore the total number of valid votes for all candidates is equal to the total number of valid ballots. But in the case of the three affected cantons, the inflated valid ballot totals in turn inflated the comparable values for the parties, thus skewing the nationwide totals for each party, which in turn produced incorrect party percentage shares at that level.

For example, in the canton of Glarus the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) polled 5,388 votes out of 12,650 cast for the four candidates contesting its single seat, and the comparable value for SVP should have been equal to its number of votes, as 5,388 divided by 12,650 votes, and then multiplied by 12,650 valid ballots equals 5,388. But since turnout data for Glarus was repeated five times, the division of 5,388 by 12,650 was multiplied by an inflated total of 63,250 valid ballots, resulting in an inflated comparable value of 26,940 for SVP in the aforementioned canton.

In all, the turnout data errors inflated the nationwide valid ballot total for the October 22 National Council election by 109,715, from 2,554,482 to 2,664,197 (and from 33,287 to 143,002 in the three affected cantons). In particular, the nationwide comparable value totals of SVP/UDC, The Centre (DM/LC) – the 2021 merger of the Christian Democratic Party (CVP/PDC) and the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP/PBD) – the Liberals (FDP/PLR) and the Social Democratic/Socialist Party (SP/PS) were inflated by 47,194, 29,158, 19,119 and 11,840, respectively. In terms of party percentage shares, the figures for SVP/UDC and LC/DM were overestimated by 0.62% and 0.52%, respectively, while those for the Greens and the Green Liberal Party (GLP/PVL) were underestimated by -0.40% and -0.31%, respectively.

Even worse, the erroneous figures remained unchanged for almost two days after the election. According to news reports, in a hastily arranged press conference on Wednesday, October 25, a contrite FSO director apologized for the faux pas, indicating that due to a work overload quality controls that ought to have been carried out at an earlier stage didn’t take place until the afternoon of Tuesday, October 24, at which point the problem was detected and corrected the following day.

A press release [PDF] issued by Switzerland’s Federal Department of Home Affairs has further details, including both the originally published and updated nationwide party percentage shares.

Meanwhile, in the morning of Tuesday, October 24 – early afternoon in Switzerland – I came across the same errors while attempting to replicate the nationwide party percentage shares published by the FSO from the election data files furnished by the agency. Once I realized it was an obvious mistake on their part, I documented my findings on a Twitter thread – which included corrected figures – and notified the FSO about them.

Quite predictably, Swiss news media hasn’t taken kindly to the matter, with one leading German-language newspaper bluntly describing it as a “fiasco,” while wondering if there are further errors waiting to be found; FSO insists there are none, and as far as I can tell that is indeed the case. Another German-language newspaper was even less charitable: writing about the “historic election mishap,” it dubbed FSO as the “Federal Office for calculation errors.”

While canton-level party percentages, and most importantly the distribution of National Council seats and its elected members, were in no way affected by the election data errors, the nationwide party percentage shifts placed the Liberals back in third place, narrowly ahead of The Centre. Before the nationwide party shares were corrected, there was speculation the latter might press for an additional seat at the expense of the former in Switzerland’s ruling seven-seat Federal Council, on account of having apparently finished third both percentage- and seat-wise; Federal Council seats are currently distributed on a 2-2-2-1 basis among SVP/UDC, SP/PS, FDP/PLR and DM/LC.

It’s been speculated as well that the Greens might press for representation in the Federal Council, in light of their improved showing in the updated nationwide results, even though the party’s updated share of the vote still fell by 3.4% compared to the 2019 National Council election.

Although nationwide party percentage shares have no bearing in the distribution of National Council seats, carried out entirely at the cantonal level, they are often perceived as a more accurate indicator of party strength than lower house parliamentary representation, which usually is slightly distorted by the country’s canton-based PR system. For example, in this year’s election Switzerland’s largest party, the right-wing SVP/UDC won 31% of the seats in the National Council (62 of 200) with a nationwide share of 27.9%.

It should also be noted that while press reports have referred to the incident as a vote counting error, a more accurate way to describe it would be as a data aggregation error, which nonetheless underscores the importance of timely verification by human beings of automated processes, all the more so given that the problem at hand could have been detected fairly quickly, and dealt with before it became a national embarrassment. Specifically, the fact that three single-seat cantons had party comparable values several times larger than their respective vote totals (and on top of that by whole integer factors) should have immediately raised a red flag: the ratio of votes to comparable values should be a figure very close to the total number of seats for multi-seat cantons, and exactly one for single-seat cantons. A subsequent turnout data check would have then brought up the inflated statistics – including crucial valid ballot totals that sometimes exceeded their respective cantons’ population figures – and the repeated commune-level records.

Incidentally, running the comparable value calculations under the alternative seat divisor method, which didn’t depend on the faulty turnout data, would have produced party shares nearly identical to the corrected figures; under the seat divisor method the parties’ comparable values in one-seat cantons are also equal to their respective number of votes, since the divisor equals one.

Meanwhile, the head of the Department of Home Affairs has ordered an administrative investigation “to analyse and improve the processes together with the FSO.” In the future, a more wide-scale automated plausibility check of the calculations will be implemented, along with the deployment of more staff to conduct controls on election day, as well as a “complete review of the overall processes and control modalities.”

Time will tell if the FSO blunder in the October 2023 National Council election has left any lasting damage. That said, the sad fact is that incidents like these undermine public confidence in the government’s ability to run election processes in a transparent manner, while potentially fueling election conspiracy theories.

Finally, on a personal note I can say that the world has truly become a global village when an elections specialist in Puerto Rico like myself can spot and diagnose an election results error in faraway Switzerland, and have the accurate figures online a day before the Swiss government finally corrected them.

Is free-list PR a “simple” electoral system?

This seems like a trick question. Of course, free-list has all sorts of complex features. In such a system, the typical rules are that any voter may cast up to M votes (M being the district magnitude) for individual candidates, even across different lists (panachage). A vote for any candidate on a list counts as a vote for that list for purposes of determining proportional seat allocation across lists, as well as for the candidate in competition among other candidates on that list.

However, this system handles votes and seats for lists just like any other list-PR system: It is designed to allocate seats to lists first, and only then to candidates. It thus is “simple” on the inter-party dimension, unlike SNTV or MNTV or STV (where candidate votes do not count towards aggregate party vote totals and seats are allocated based only on candidate votes).

My general definition of a “simple” electoral system is one that is a single-tier, single-round, party-vote system. The free-list could be said to violate that last part of the definition, in that “party vote” maybe should mean a single party vote per voter. My instinct is to keep free list in, because it remains “simple” in terms of how it processes the votes across lists. But I could be convinced otherwise, given that effectively every voter can vote for more than one list–a “dividual vote” in Gallagher’s terms.¹

In Votes from Seats, Taagepera and I kept at least three free-list systems in our dataset: Honduras (since 2005), Luxembourg, and Switzerland. The issue came back to my mind because of my consideration of including some smaller countries and non-independent territories in a dataset for some further analysis of key questions. One of the smaller countries that could be added to the data is Liechtenstein, which I believe uses a free-list PR system. My gut says “yes, include” but now I wonder if we already violated our own criteria² in having those free-list systems in the prior analysis. To be clear, none of our results would be changed if we had dropped them.³ It is just a matter of consistency of criteria.

Questions like this always nag comparative analysis, or science more generally. What things are part of the set being analyzed? It is not always clear-cut.

____

1. Note that there is no question regarding standard open-list PR: Even if there are multiple candidate preference votes cast per voter, as in Peru, only a single list vote is registered per voter.
2. In fact, on p. 31 of Votes from Seats, we say “Only categorical ballots and a single round of voting are simple, by our definition.” A free-list ballot is dividual and thus not categorical. However, the reason we give for limiting the coverage to categorical ballots is that “other ballot formats… may violate a basic criterion for simplicity in the translation of votes into seats: the rank-size principle” (emphasis in original). For example, the party with the most aggregate votes in a district may not have the most seats allocated in the district (or at least tied for most with the second-most voted party). This violation of the rank-size principle can occur with SNTV, STV, and MNTV, but as noted above it can’t occur in free-list PR (per my understanding, anyway). I note that in a later work, Party Personnel, my coauthors and I seem to adopt a stricter definition. On p. 53 of that book, we say that simple means “a voter votes once, and this vote counts for the entire party list of candidates.” Yet the conceptual point there is somewhat different, in that we are referring to “simple vote” not simple electoral system, and we remove open-list PR from the standard of simple vote because they permit differentiation of candidates within a list in the same district. But as for the vote counting for the entire list, free list still meets that part of the criterion. (A reminder that “voting system” is not a synonym for “electoral system”!)
3. Although I did not think of this possible issue with free lists at the time, I definitely ran robustness-check regressions with Switzerland dropped. I did so mainly because of its multiparty alliance feature, which also is a complex feature for reasons discussed in the book (mainly with reference to Finland and Chile). Doing so did not affect the results, so we left the case in. There are not enough elections from the other free-list cases, nor are they observably different on our outcomes of interest, that they could affect results. (Switzerland is observably different–far more fragmented than expected for its seat product, and that seems to be mostly due to alliances, even above the impact of its ethnic fragmentation–see p. 269 of Votes from Seats. But the inclusion or exclusion fo the case is immaterial for the overall results.)

NZ2020: Maori Party list-candidate attributes and “burning bridges”

The New Zealand Maori Party has introduced its party list for the 2020 election, now set for 17 October. The press release boasts of the backgrounds of the candidates, including some sports celebrities and experienced local officeholders. Interestingly, one of the co-leaders has adopted a “burning bridges” strategy–being placed too low on the list (7th) to be elected if he does not win his district (electorate) under New Zealand’s mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. (In some past elections, the party has won only district seats; it did not win any seats at all in 2017.)

The press release says, in part:

In our list we have champion athletes: the founder of Iron Māori (Heather Te Au Skipworth); a coordinator for the diploma in sport and recreation- and a crossfit trainer (Fallyn Flavell); a fourth dan black belt in aikido (Mariameno Kapa-Kingi) and competitive rower (Tumanako Silveria).

We have candidates with vast expertise and experience in local government (Merepeka Raukawa-Tait, Elijah Pue, John Tamihere, Rangi Mclean, Debbie Ngarewa-Packer); a former Cabinet Minister Hon Tamihere; two past youth MPs (Eru Kapa-Kingi and Elijah Pue); and former candidates for the Māori Party, Mana Motuhake, Alliance Labour, and the Christian Heritage Party.

It also has this lovely nugget:

“We are campaigning on the mantra of MMP: More Māori in Parliament” said Che Wilson [party president].

Regarding co-leader John Tamihere, Waatea News quotes him as explaining his taking such a low list position:

This is the Māori thing to do and I could not go back to Parliament if I didn’t have the mandate of the people on the street… My six fellow candidates have put themselves and their whānau up for this challenge and this is my way of showing my support for their sacrifice.

In 2017, the party was within five percentages points in only one of the Maori set-aside electorates, Te Tai Hauāuru. Labour won all seven of them. Back to 2014, the party won two of the electorates, plus one list seat (which I believe is the only list seat it has ever won).

I have not seen polling of the Maori electorates. Perhaps someone reading this has. But with Labour currently running so far ahead of its 2017 showing in national polls, it would seem the Maori candidates have their work cut out for them if the party is to recover.

(The idea of candidates in mixed-member systems “burning bridges” by not taking an electable list rank comes from Krauss, Nemoto, and Pakennen, 2011.)

Ecuador’s 2019 Local Elections

On March 24, 2019, Ecuador held sectional elections to elect 23 provincial prefects, 221 mayors, 867 city councilors, 438 rural councilors, 4,089 members of rural parish councils, and seven councilors of the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control (CPCCS), a social regulatory body. The elections had a little bit of everything: complex electoral rules and a mixture of systems, bickering over how to count votes, and results that reinforce what political scientists know about electoral systems’ impacts on party systems. I was fortunate enough to observe these elections as part of the Organization of American States’ Electoral Observation Mission (EOM). Given that the EOM’s final report was finally presented to the OAS Permanent Council until June 19, 2020, I can now offer some political science-based reflections on the experience. 

I’ll describe the array of electoral rules and then highlight three noteworthy factors:

1. the difficulty in counting null votes in a plurality-at-large election;
2. the political party atomization that “pluralitarian” and free list proportional representation produced; and
3. the persistence of ballot order effects in plurality-at-large elections, even with order randomization.

It should be noted that Ecuadorian legislators finally passed a bill in December 2019 to switch from free list PR to closed and blocked lists for multi-member elections, among other changes.

Electoral Systems

Since 1998, elections in Ecuador have been cognitively demanding due to the complexity of the electoral lists and rules governing voting.  2019 was no exception. Despite being a national process, not all voters cast the same number of votes or even used the same number of ballots: voters in urban areas received six ballots to elect representatives at four levels of government (prefect, mayor, urban councilor, CPCCS representatives), while voters in rural areas received seven ballots for five levels of government (prefect, mayor, rural councilor, rural parish boards, CPCCS representatives). Moreover, the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) employed three different electoral systems across these five different offices:

1. Prefects: First-past-the-post
2. Mayors: First-past-the-post
3. Urban and rural canton councils: Free list PR (5 ≤ M ≤ 15)
4. Rural parish councils: Free list PR (M=5 or 7)
5. CPCCS (three different ballots): Plurality-at-large, Plurality-at-large, First-past-the-post

The free list, which Tom Mustillo and I have written about and which is sometimes called “panachage” or “open ballot”, is a unique variation of the open list where voters can: 1) cast preference votes for candidates; 2) cast multiple preference votes; and 3) distribute preferences across multiple lists. Alternatively, voters can cast a single list vote. To determine seat distribution, votes are pooled at the party list level (an important detail that distinguishes the free list from plurality-at-large). For national legislative elections, only Switzerland, Luxembourg, Honduras, and El Salvador now use this system, although it is more common at a subnational level in Europe. This system presents a number of complexities for voters (since there are so many candidates from which to choose and so many votes to cast) as well as vote counters (because each voter’s number of votes varies by district magnitude and voters are not required to cast all their votes).

There is a lot of “choice” available to voters.  Here is a 2019 ballot for urban councilors from a district in Quito with M=5 that demonstrates it nicely. Voters in this district are allowed to cast up to five votes within or across the 22 party lists, or five out of 110 total candidates.  It is no surprise that voters often opt for list votes (plancha, in Spanish) or use only a portion of their preference votes.

Figure 1. Ballot for urban councilors from a district in Quito

 

Still, Ecuadorian voters should have been accustomed to the free list: before legislators phased in out in late 2019 in favor of closed lists, voters had been using it for 17 years in both national and local elections.

Being tapped with the civic responsibility of working a polling station is a lot of work for elections like these. Poll workers had to tally votes manually, recording not just the choices on six or seven ballots, but counting all M votes on the free list ballots and finding the three choices on the men’s and women’s CPCCS ballots as well (something I explain in greater depth below). The four-person team at the table I was assigned to “quick count” took more than seven hours to tally all of their 250-300 voters’ votes (see the photo below as they were just beginning).

Figure 2. Poll workers sorting ballots before counting votes

 

1. Counting Null Votes under Plurality-at-Large

Despite the complexities of the free list, the most compelling ballot in this election turned out to be the one used to elect CPCCS representatives.  After a 2018 plebiscite turned this appointed seven-person body into an elected one, electors were supposed to be given seven votes to be distributed however they wanted across the entire ballot (e.g. plurality-at-large/MNTV/block voting). However, in February 2019, the CNE stipulated that to maintain gender parity and minority representation, it would divide the single ballot into three separate ballots:

• A “men’s ballot”, from which voters could cast three votes (plurality-at-large);
• A “women’s ballot”, from which voters could cast three votes (plurality-at-large), and;
• A ballot with indigenous/Afro-descendent/ex-pat candidates, from which voters could cast one vote (SMD plurality).

How to count the votes—or in this case, the non-votes—dominated pre-election discourse.

The CPCCS is an autonomous entity responsible for appointing authorities of the Ombudsman’s Office, the Office of the Comptroller General of the State, and state superintendencies, as well as influencing the designation of certain electoral and judicial authorities.  Many politicians and civil society organizations long decried the CPCCS and argued that it should be eliminated as a political body.

Paragraph 3 of Article 147 of Ecuador’s Code of Democracy states that elections can be nullified, “when the null votes exceed the totality of the candidates’ votes, of the respective lists, in a specific circumscription, for each office”. Predictably, there was a current of public opinion in these elections that exhorted voters to cast a null vote as a way to protest the body and demand a national plebiscite on its existence. However, counting the null votes for an office where the voter can cast up to seven votes between three ballots turned out to be more complicated than it may first appear.

Specifically, there is no way to satisfy the “one person, one vote” principal stipulated in the Ecuadorian Constitution if electoral authorities count votes instead of ballots. There are two basic scenarios:

• Scenario 1 (original proposal): A null vote on a plurality-at-large ballot (M=3) is equal to a single vote, meaning that a null voter is only able to cast 3/7 of a null vote (1/7 + 1/7 + 1/7 on each of the three ballots) while a valid voter can cast 7/7 of a vote (3/7 + 3/7 + 1/7)—effectively disenfranchising the null voter.
• Scenario 2 (counter-proposal): A null vote on a plurality-at-large ballot (M=3) is equal to three null votes. This way, both valid and null voters get to exercise a full vote (3/7 + 3/7 + 1/7 in each case). The problem is, the system does not permit cumulation voting, which means a) that the null voter is effectively casting three cumulation votes while a valid voter cannot do the same thing; and b) that anyone using fewer than M valid votes per list ends up using fewer votes than the null voter (e.g. a single blank on the first ballot would give the voter 2/7 + 3/7 + 1/7 = 6/7 of a vote).

Electoral authorities were divided on the interpretation, but eventually settled on the first counting rule. Regardless, the null counting method would not have mattered, since just over 20% of the ballots registered null votes against 50% of valid votes (more than 20% of the ballot for CPCCS were also left blank). 

2. Personal Voting and Party System Atomization

Low entrance barriers and guaranteed public financing gave rise to the participation of a whopping 278 political parties, movements, and local organizations. However, all three electoral systems also incentivize the personal vote at the expense of the party. The results were predictable, with extreme party system fragmentation and a lack of mandate for most elected officials.

To just take the FPTP elections, 19 different parties and 10 local political movements split up the 23 prefectures (most of them as part of electoral alliances), with the Social Christian Party winning the most with eight (35%).  Eight parties or movements won just a single prefecture.

There was greater atomization at the level of the elections for mayor. There, 42 parties or movements gained political representation in the 221 mayoralties. Sixteen different political parties won ten or more mayoralties, with the most successful party, the Social Christian Party, earning just 43 mayoralties nationwide (19.5% of the national total). The largest party in the preceding twelve years, President Lenín Moreno’s Alianza Pais (“Country Alliance”), managed only 27 mayors nationwide, falling to the fourth position at national level. The excess of municipal and provincial movements led to the formation of various electoral alliances; in fact, multi-party electoral coalitions won 112 of the 221 mayoralties.

These results suggest that without significant changes, the 2021 general elections are likely to be contested by a panoply of parties with weak roots and limited national ambitions, akin to what we see in some other Latin American countries, like Peru.

3. Ballot Order Effects

A third interesting pattern to emerge was a ballot order effect for the CPCCS elections.  Recognizing the advantage that candidates near the top of the ballot hold over those placed toward the bottom, the CNE decided candidate placement on each of the three CPCCS ballots in February 2019 via lottery, on national television and in the presence of a public notary.

The 28-candidate men’s CPCCS ballot looked like this, with the women’s ballot and minorities’ ballot organized a similar way:

Figure 3. The CPCCS ballot for men

 

Despite the lottery, which quite literally randomized candidate placement, there is evidence that candidates towards the top of list enjoyed a distinct advantage over those toward the bottom. The figure below is a scatterplot of CPCCS ballot placement and votes. Red circles represent women candidates (11 nominations), squares are the men candidates (28 nominations), and the diamonds the minority candidates (4 nominations); for each list, I also included the best fit line to show the relationship between ballot position and votes received. In all three cases, there is a clear negative relationship.

Figure 4. Scatterplot of CPCCS ballot placement and votes

 

This relationship is statistically significant for two of the three lists (men and women; there were only four candidates on the third list). To test the relationship suggested in the figure, I ran a linear regression of the effect of candidate on electoral performance. Employing list fixed effects, the results are consistent with the scatterplot. For each change in position, the mean CPCCS candidate lost around 18,126 votes (p<0.05), or a total of 507,528 votes (18,126) over the range of the 28 positions on the men’s list.  Despite placement randomization, then, this vote is just one more example of the pervasiveness of ballot placement effects; given financial and technical constraints (e.g. inability to randomize candidate placement for each paper ballot), it’s hard to imagine how the CNE could have avoided this problem.

Sectional elections in a small country like Ecuador are not often on the radar of international analysts.  However, the multitude of electoral systems, debate over null vote counting, and ballot order effectd make it as compelling a case study as many national elections in larger countries that grab international headlines.

Ecuador list-type change

Ecuador will travel a somewhat rare path in electoral reform: Abandoning a highly candidate-centered system in favor of a highly party-centered one.

In recent elections, Ecuador has used a free list system, in which voters could cast up to M votes (where M is the number of seats in the district) for candidates on one or more different party lists. Any vote for a candidate also counted as a vote for the list for purposes of inter-list allocation. Broadly speaking, a form of the “panachage” systems used in Luxembourg and Switzerland, as well as in recent years El Salvador.

A newly passed reform will switch Ecuador’s list type to closed-list PR.

It is unusual for countries to make a move like this. Japan moved from SNTV to MMM in its first-chamber elections, so that is another example of abolishing intra-party choice. But MMM is still quite candidate-centered, given single-seat districts. (In addition, the optional procedure in the Japanese variant for ranking lists based on district-level performance also preserves a candidate-centered feature, even though candidates on the list do not compete directly with one another for votes.) Colombia moved from de-facto SNTV to a list system, with parties having the option to present either an open or closed list. But I doubt anyone has moved from free list to closed list before. Even a move from open to closed lists must be very rare.

At the same time, Ecuador’s inter-list allocation will move from D’Hondt to “Webster” (Ste.-Laguë).

Even if you do not read Spanish, the linked news item is worth a visit, as it shows a simulation of how the party seat totals would have been different at the last election had Webster already been in place.

I have one concern with the change, if the video also at the linked item accurately portrays what the new ballot will look like. Voters might still tend to mark candidate images in different lists, as the ballot depicted is almost identical. That would make it impossible to tell which one list the voter would favor. But maybe this is not what the ballot really will look like. One must hope not.

Thanks to John Polga for the tip.

Israel 2019b: Grouping the parties, relative to 2019a

As readers of this blog are sure to be aware, Israel is soon to have its second general election of 2019. The election in April did not result in a governing coalition being formed, and so the Knesset dissolved itself and set a very early election for 17 September, giving us election 2019b. That’s almost here!

A little time has passed now since the final lists of candidates were submitted, which is also the process through which parties may forge pre-electoral alliances with other parties, presenting a common list.

In what follows, I want to review the parties by groups, by which I mean either formal alliances for this election, or just parties/alliances with affinities for others in terms of ideological placement or demographics. I will compare the number of lists in these groups (some of which are a little arbitrary) to what we saw in the April election. In each group, I will indicate how many separate lists there were in April and how many there are for September.

Likud and close buddies

2019a: 2

2019b: 1

Keep this in mind when looking at polls and comparing to April: Likud, headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, won 35 seats in April’s election. However, in this election, its list includes Kulanu (Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon’s party, which first ran in 2015). So we have to compare Likud this time with Likud+Kulanu last time. Combining them, they won 39 seats in April. Thus polls showing 30-32 seats for this next election indicate a substantial weakening of Netanyahu’s position.

Haredi parties

2019a: 2

2019b: 2

Nothing changes here. United Torah Judaism and Shas (Ashkenazi and Sephardi Haredi parties, respectively), are both running again. Bibi’s favorite partners.

Farther right: Ultranationalist

2019a: 2

2019b: 1*

Before the April election, two of the leaders of Jewish Home (Bayit Yehudi) split off and formed a new party, New Right (HaYamin HeHadash), led by Naftali Bennet and Ayelet Shaked. They failed to clear the 3.25% threshold, leaving only the list that included the rest of what had been Jewish Home (rebranded Union of Right Wing Parties, or URWP) to win seats in the Knesset.

For the September election, they are together again. Somewhat surprisingly, the hardline religious (but not-Haredi) parties inside Jewish Home accepted a woman, Shaked, as the leader. The new-old list is now called Rightward (or To the Right; Yamina). The list has been polling at around 10 seats, a significant increase on what they had in April, though in fact steady support given URWP’s 6 and what would have been New Right’s 4 had they not just missed the threshold.

The asterisk above is that we could count another list for 2019b, but it is not likely to get seats. I am referring to Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit), the Kahanist (read: racist) party that was part of the URWP in April, due to controversial deal brokered by Netanyahu. Otzma is running separately this time (it initially announced an alliance with an even more fringy party, Noam, but that fell apart.)

(There was also a Bayit Yehudi candidate who was given a slot on the Likud list in April but will not be this time; it must be because of this candidate that Knesset Jeremy indicates 38, rather than 39, for Likud+Kulanu in comparing seats at the last election to current polling.)

Center-something and hoping for “unity”

2019a: 2

2019b: 2

Here I am referring to both the Blue & White list, headed by Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid, and Yisrael Beteinu (YB), headed by Avigdor Liberman. Blue & White remains intact, despite its internal difficulties. It tied Likud in April with 35 seats, and is generally running even or 1-2 seats behind Likud-Kulanu this time (so 29-31 seats). Are they center-left? Center-right? Just center? Beats me. Basically, they are the “we are tough guys who can take over from Bibi” alliance.

Liberman is often classified as hard right, and in terms of security, he certainly fits that description. However, his party has always been more strictly secular than others on the right, broadly defined. If we have to do the “left-right” thing, that makes him pretty left on the religion–state dimension. Whatever he is, it was his refusal to (re-)join a Likud+ultranationalist+Haredi coalition that led to there being a 2019b election. He has called for a “unity” (grand coalition) government. So let’s put him in the “center”. In any case, the number of lists remains the same in this grouping. Yisrael Beteinu is polling around 10 seats. That would double the April result, suggesting that his effort to raise the salience of the secular issue by not rejoining the Bibi bloc earlier this year is paying off.

As a bonus, and an indicator of their likeminded positions, these two have signed a surplus agreement. These agreements allow two lists to pool votes for purposes of calculating the D’Hondt quotients for seat allocation (as long as both clear the threshold). An agreement can often result in an additional seat for the combine, which usually will go to the larger list in the agreement. In an election in which one seat might make a difference, that’s not a trivial or mere “technical” matter. (The two parties did not have such an agreement with one another in April, when YB had a deal with New Right.)

Zionist old left and new partners

2019a: 3

2019b: 2

Two left-wing parties that won seats in April, plus another party that did not; two alliances now. There is quite some significant reshuffling here. The two seat-winning lists in April were Labor and Meretz, and both had pretty bad results. Labor did especially badly, coming in with only 6 seats, despite having been the main component of the second largest list overall and leading opposition alliance, Zionist Union, in 2015 (and in older history, the main governing party). Meretz won only 4. Both were thus facing risk of extinction, and so they got rather creative.

Labor changed its leader (yes, again), choosing Amir Peretz (yes, again). It then formed an alliance with Gesher, led by Orly Levy. Given that Gesher emphasizes social concerns, like cost of living, it is not wrong to classify it as left. But it seems more than a little odd. Levy was originally a member of the Knesset for Yisrael Beteinu, who split off to sit as an independent when Liberman took the party into the government some months after the 2015 election. She formed a joint list with Labor in early August, under the slogan, “People First“.

Meretz is now in an alliance that is known as Democratic Union. The leader is Meretz chairman Nitzan Horowitz. Meretz has joined up with two alliance partners for this election. One is the Green Movement, which will now be headed by a defector from Labor, Stav Shaffir. She was among the leaders of the 2011 social protest movement who then became a Labor MK. She was also one of the leadership contenders in Labor just this past June, when she lost to Peretz. Now she is the second candidate on the list of the Democratic Union. The other component is a new party called Democratic Israel, set up by Ehud Barak (yes, again); the former PM and Defense Minister is ranked only tenth, and looks somewhat unlikely to win a seat.

The Democratic Union list also includes a prominent Reform Rabbi, Gilad Kariv (ranked 11th; he had run with Labor in April, but was ranked at a very unrealistic 25th), and Yael Cohen-Paran, the first Green Party MK. Cohen-Paran entered the Knesset in late 2015 as a member of Zionist Union (after initially being the first loser, at rank #25); she is ranked 8th this time and thus is in a potentially realistic slot.

(Yes, the facts in that last paragraph would be sufficient for me to vote for this list, if I had a vote. Speaking of Shaffir, she has a really inspiring video about why young people should go into politics, as she did. And also an excellent recent democrat-to-Democrat video.)

Non-Zionist left/Arab parties

2019a: 2

2019b: 1

Yes, the Joint List is back. The various Arab and non-Zionist parties had formed the alliance prior to the 2015 election, the first one with the higher threshold. They then split prior to April’s election into two separate lists (both of which won seats, though it was a rather close call for Ra’am-Balad). They are back together, and are shown as getting 10-12 seats in most polls. That could place them third (as they were in 2015, with 13) or fourth (depending on how well Yamina does).

---

So there you have it. Six groups (as I defined them), which accounted for thirteen different lists in April, down to nine for this election (or ten if we count Otzma). It is almost as if the politicians learned the lesson from the fragmentation and bargaining stalemate of 2019a. Even so, polls consistently suggest that Likud+Haredi+Yamina will probably remain short of the 61 seats needed for a majority, while once again a center-left majority coalition is also not likely to be possible.

Open-list PR and the definition of antisemitism

Here’s an unexpected convergence of my interests. Open-list PR has helped lead to a Finnish organization’s adoption of the IHRA working definition of anti-Semitism.

Via JPost:

The recently elected Finnish MP Hussein al-Taee, a supporter of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was embroiled in an antisemitism, racism and homophobia scandal in May. After revelations in the Israeli and Finnish media about his antisemitic Facebook posts CMI [Crisis Management Initiative] scrubbed him from its website…

Alas he’s still in parliament. His preference votes placed him sixth on the SDP list, which won 7 seats In Uusimaa district; he was a mere 63 votes ahead of the list’s first loser.

It is possible that his views may have helped him edge out other candidates and win a seat. But on the positive side, his election evidently helped increase sensitivity of the CMI to anti-semitism.

Candidates on closed lists: If only Glick had been ranked higher

I do this occasional series on party lists, and how candidates can matter, even when the list is closed (meaning voters can’t vote for a specific candidate, and the order in which candidates would be elected is set by the party, prior to the election).

Here is another one for the files.

An official of the New Right party in Israel has claimed that the party would have cleared the 3.25% threshold if only one of its candidates, Caroline Glick, had been ranked in the top 4. A party that clears the threshold gets 4 seats as a minimum. Glick, a US-born author, was ranked 6th.

The official making the claim is none other than Jeremy Saltan, whose polling aggregations I referred to throughout the campaign. He was New Right’s head of outreach to English-speaking voters.

Saltan is quoted in the Times of Israel as saying, “Already during the campaign Anglos told me they would have voted for us if we put her higher.”

Further, “Saltan said the party should have emphasized that it was the only party with a US-born candidate featured prominently on its slate and campaign.”

While I would tend to be a little skeptical of a claim like this, I would not rule it out. In the final results, the party missed the threshold by a slim margin, ending up with 3.22%. So it is possible that potential Anglo voters could have stayed with the party, rather than defect to Likud (or United Right or even Zehut) had they been more confident it would clear the threshold, and that Glick would be elected.

My main skepticism is that the party was generally polling at more than 4 seats, so if anything, the fact that she was individually marginal, but the party (allegedly) was not, should have encouraged more voters, not fewer, to favor New Right if they were otherwise wavering.

Anyway, it is always good to have another one for the “candidates matter, even in closed lists” file.

Israel 2019 result

[Updated with final results]

The election results are final, after a couple of days of doubt about just who had cleared, or not cleared, the 3.25% threshold, and a few more days of final scrutiny (which cut Likud’s total by one seat and boosted the UTJ). The New Right, the party formed by Naftali Bennet and Ayelet Shaked when they bolted from Jewish Home (Bayit Yehudi), came up just short of winning any seats. With 3.22% of the vote, the party now joins the list of contenders for nearest miss of all time in any country with a nationwide threshold.

Meanwhile, one of the two Arab lists in this election, Ra’am-Balad, which many polls showed falling below the threshold, just made it, with 3.34%. Moshe Feiglin’s Zehut (build the Third Temple now and smoke dope!), which was the sensation of the latter part of the campaign with most polls showing it well above the threshold, came in at only 2.73%. I don’t usually ascribe great impact to specific campaign stunts, but his appearance on a comic show just before the election was one of the most bizarre things I have ever seen a politician do. Could it have cost him votes of wavering voters who had mistakenly thought he was a serious politician?

The contest between Likud and the opposition alliance, Blue & White, would have been exciting if only there had actually been more at stake. Two of the three exit polls showed B&W ahead, but there was not much doubt that Likud would be in a better position to form a coalition than B&W, even before the two parties pulled even. Then, in the final results, Likud pulled ahead.

The votes for the top two were 26.45% for Likud and 26.12% for B&W. In seats, Likud has the edge, 36-35.

Taking all the parties in the government at the time the election was called, we have results for the new Knesset (which has 120 seats total) as follows:

Party/alliance	2019	2015
Likud	35	30
Shas	8	7
UTJ	8	6
URWP	5	8
Kulanu	4	10
total	60	61

The table compares the results with 2015; the number for URWP (Union of Right Wing Parties) for 2015 refers to Jewish Home (Bayit Yehudi), which, minus New Right, is the main component in the new Union.

At first glance, this looks like potentially bad news for current PM and Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu. However, if he comes to agreement with Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home), the total rises to 65. YB won 6 seats in 2015 and will have 5 in the new Knesset.

Bargaining with YB leader Avigdor Liberman is never easy. He joined the government some time after it was formed following the 2015 election. (One of those elected in 2015, Orly Levy, defected when the party joined the government.) He also left the government about a year before the term was up, in November, resigning as Defense Minister and bashing Netanyahu for being too soft on Hamas. That move left the coalition with just a bare majority of 61 seats and was one of the things that precipitated the election being held early. Shortly after the polls closed, Liberman stated that he would not recommend anyone for prime minister when the various faction heads meet with the president, who then is obliged to assess who has the best chance of forming a government.

Even if Liberman were to remain in opposition–and he may simply be playing hard to get–it would not necessarily prevent Netanyahu from forming a government. There is no requirement for 61 affirmative votes. And there is no way that Liberman is going to vote with the left and Arab parties for an alternative. However, with or without Yisrael Beitenu, it may be another relatively unstable government.

The other possibility, of course, is a coalition of the top two parties–a so-called “unity” (or dare I say “grand coalition“?) government. An “unsourced report” says this is under consideration. I say we consider this spin until proven otherwise. On the other hand, we should also take with a grain of salt the statement by Yair Lapid (no. 2 in Blue & White) that he is “personally opposed to sitting in a government with Netanyahu.” At this point, most of what is said, either by leaders in public or by various unnamed sources, is just part of the bargaining process.

A Likud-BW coalition would be quite a letdown to voters who voted for B&W because Gantz told them over and over again how the most important thing was to kick out Netanyahu. Still, I do not think we should assume it is completely ruled out till we see how the bargaining among the right-wing parties unfolds.

As far as specific candidates elected, there are some interesting developments. Israeli lists are, of course, closed. So when a party or alliance list performs at the outer limits of what is expected, some candidates may be elected whose personal attributes or social-group ties were part of the reason for their being given a marginal rank in the first place. Both Likud and Blue & White outperformed the pre-election polls. With 35 seats, B&W elects a candidate who was the country’s first openly gay mayor (Eitan Ginzburg, of Ra’anana), who was #32 on the list. In fact, the number of LGBT members hits a record high, with five, who also include Idan Roll and Yorai Lahav Hertzano, #34 and 35 on the B&W list. In addition, B&W elects Gadi Yevarkan (#33), an Ethiopian immigrant.

Likud’s over-performance elects two additional women from a party list that had only two in its top ten and just a few more in the top 30: May Golan (#32 and an anti-immigrant activist) and Osnat Mark (#35, already in the Knesset since last year). (One of the most interesting will be Keren Barak, who had a safe slot at #24. Click the link to see what I mean.)

With only four seats, Meretz failed to elect its first-ever Druze candidate, Ali Salalha, who was ranked #5. I have not checked city-level results to see if Meretz dominated the vote in his home town of Beit Jann, as was expected due to his candidacy. But it was not enough for an extra seat. Meretz’s vote share was 3.63%; the next largest list was able to win five seats, with 3.70%. So Salalha may not have missed by much. (Meretz also had an Ethiopian immigrant, Mehereta Baruch Ron, a deputy mayor of Tel Aviv, at #6.)

The party formed by Orly Levy Abekassis (the YB defector mentioned above), Gesher, was a big flop. It won only 1.73%. Her social policy emphasis had looked like it could win 5 or as many as 8 seats according to polls through much of last year, but it faded rapidly once the campaign really got underway. She should have struck a deal with B&W. It might have netted them a couple more seats, although even then, a B&W-led government would have remained out of reach, most likely.

I’ll be back with more later about the aggregate outcome.

Candidates on closed party lists featured in inter-party competition

A recurring theme around here is how candidates matter, even on closed lists and even in very high magnitude districts (where we might expect them to matter least).

Here are a couple of examples from the current Israeli campaign.

A recent Haaretz article by Judy Maltz notes that, “Having a Druze representative on a party ticket… has also proven helpful in bringing in votes in that candidate’s hometown.” Several examples are cited.

The back-story is that more parties than ever before are including candidates from the Druze minority this time. In recent elections, the Druze have tended to vote for right-wing parties, but there was considerable backlash in the community to the Basic Law–Nation-State, and so other parties are seeking to capitalize.

For instance, if Blue & White (the joint list of Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid) wins at least 25 seats, the Knesset will have its first Druze woman. The list has been polling at 29-32 seats in recent polls, so she looks likely to be elected. If Meretz gets 5, that left-wing party will have its first Druze MK. The party has been right around 5-6 seats in most polls, although some have put it only at 4 (which is the minimum a party is likely to win, if it wins any, given the threshold).

Meanwhile, the New Right (led by Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked, formerly of the Jewish Home party) has a candidate who has a following among English-speaking voters, Caroline Glick. She is ranked 6th. The New Right is polling at anywhere from around five to seven seats, so she is in that marginal range. Some Anglo voters may be finding the Zehut list led by Moshe Feiglin appealing (as much as it makes me shudder to realize that). A JPost article by Lahav Harkov notes:

Shaked said that “people debating between us and Feiglin should think whether they want to bring Caroline into the Knesset, or Libby Molad from the Green Leaf Party…”

The reference is to a candidate on the list of Zehut, which held an “open primary” and wound up with quite an eclectic set of candidates and issue stances. Molad is ranked 5th on the Zehut list, which has been polling above the threshold just recently in many polls, with 4-6 seats likely, if it wins any.

So Shaked of New Right is basically telling these wavering voters that they could make the difference between two individual marginal candidates, Glick or Molad.

As an aside, the cannabis issue may be on the line in this election: Feiglin recently stated he would not join a government if it did not commit to legalizing cannabis. I guess weed is the new green line in Israeli elections. According to many polls, the combined right-wing bloc may be close enough to 61 seats that Zehut could even be needed to make a coalition, although there is also a good chance it won’t be needed even if it does clear the threshold.

While we are on the topic of Feiglin, I have been using him for a few years now in various courses to make the point about the importance of candidates on closed lists. I use an anecdote from 2009, when Feiglin was still with Likud. For that campaign, he had an initial list rank of 19, which would have been good enough for a seat. But, fearing a backlash over Feiglin’s extreme nationalism, leader Benjamin Netanyahu managed to get Feiglin bumped down to the 36th slot, which was sure to be too low for a seat (the party ended up with 27 seats). Feiglin said at the time, “We all know when the Likud began to fall. The moment I was in a good spot, the Likud jumped to 40 mandates, but when I dropped,” so did the Likud. It is a fun case of a candidate claiming he could be worth some thirteen seats, if only he were in the top 20 on the list!

Finally, and slightly off-topic, my new favorite Israeli electoral rule is the one barring candidates from promising blessings for votes.

_________
Earlier this week at F&V regarding candidates on closed lists: a case from South Africa.

And, on previous elections in Israel and the role of candidates at marginal ranks representing certain groups: Personal vote/group representation in Shas list (2006); Campaigning around the threshold (2013); Marginal candidates on closed lists (2015).

Party lists for South Africa 2019

South Africa’s general election is approaching–8 May. Parties are releasing their lists. EWN reports the names of the top 20 candidates on the national list of the Democratic Alliance (and has a link to the rest of the lists).

Meanwhile, africanews reports that the African National Congress has been criticized for having “tainted politicians” who were close to former president Jacob Zuma on its list. For instance,

Zuma allies Nomvula Mokonyane, the environment minister who was recently implicated in graft at a corruption inquiry, and Bathabile Dlamini who was at the centre of a benefits payments fiasco, are named among the top 10 candidates on the list.

As a political analyst, Ralph Mathekga, is quoted as saying: “The ANC list is very revealing.”

Perhaps so, and that is a reminder that it is not true (as critics of closed lists often claim) that candidates do not matter when the list is closed and thus voters are unable to vote for specific candidates. In fact, the set of candidates a party selects, especially in top and thus safe ranks (for a major party) do provide clues about the party’s priorities. In the ANC’s case, presumably one of the priorities is to keep the different wings of the party within the tent, even if that means potentially diluting its message of having tackled corruption by ousting the previous incumbent leader, thereby allowing it to enter this election with a new incumbent at the helm. Beneath that level, of course, it is the same party.

Other parties, like the DA and the Economic Freedom Fighters, will use the slate of candidates against the ANC. The candidates do matter–even on closed lists! Or at least opposition parties may act as if they do. Whether voters will vote against a ruling party because they do not like specific candidates in various ranks is, of course, another matter.

For the upcoming Israeli election, divisions on the left are not the problem

Israel’s general election has been set for 9 April. This election is both “late” and “early”. The term is four years, and this election will be more than four years after the last election (which was in March, 2015). Yet under Israel’s Basic Law provision on election dates, the date for 2019 could have been as late as November. Nonetheless, the Knesset passed a bill in late December setting the election date.

All indications, at least for now, are that the Likud and its leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, will remain at the head of the government following the election. Polls put Likud far ahead of the second party, which in many polls is a new entrant, Israel’s Resilience, founded by former IDF chief of staff, Benny Gantz. The real question is who will be the coalition partners. Both the governing “nationalist camp” and the opposition feature numerous parties, as usual, but also splits, including several new entrants since the election was announced.

There is often poor understanding of how Israeli politics works. To a degree, that’s understandable, as it is a complex political scene (and society). However, there is really no excuse for a major publication like The Economist getting it as wrong as it did in its 3 January edition.

The author of the piece shows a poor understanding of the dynamics of proportional representation and parliamentary government, mistakenly claiming that the center-left could win if only it were not divided into so many different parties. I want to use this claim as a foil, and illustrate why it is so mistaken.

Basically, the reason there are so many parties in Israel is two-fold: there are real socio-political divisions and there is a quite extreme proportional-representation system. Because of the high proportionality, divisions within a potential governing bloc are quite unlikely to be the reason such a bloc fails ultimately to end up in government. (Yes, there is a moderately high threshold that can cause some wasting of votes. We will come back to that.) A government needs to command the votes of one more than half the Knesset (61 of 120); no party will win a majority (none ever has), and so the process of forming a government is one of post-electoral bargaining. Whoever can get 61 votes in the Knesset (assembly) forms the government. A minority government–tolerated by some Knesset parties that don’t have a formal governing role–is theoretically possible, as it almost always is in a parliamentary democracy, but highly unlikely in Israel.

The Economist claimed that Netanyahu could be defeated if only the opposition would unite. The premise is based on two observations; they are true as far as they go, but that is not very far. First,

Under Mr Netanyahu, Likud has never received more than a quarter of the national vote. Yet it has dominated Israeli politics with the help of smaller nationalist and religious parties.

Second,

Were [opposition parties] running as one they would probably gather 40% of the vote, overtaking Likud.

The idea of a united center-left overtaking Likud is plausible, although 40% could be a stretch. Based on the aggregation of recent polls, all the opposition parties, not including Yisrael Beiteinu and the Joint List, come to an estimated 45.5 seats, which would be about 38%. So if all those parties formed one alliance list, they might get close to 40%. Moreover, is not out of the question that Yisrael Beiteinu (YB), which left the government in November, could join a center-left coalition. Even if they get to 40%, however, getting to the 61 seats needed for a majority remains a stretch. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to construct coalition scenarios around the Joint List being in. (The reasons why would be a topic for another thread; the short version is they would not accept if invited to join a governing coalition, which they won’t be.)

The problem is that this 38% or 40% might still not be enough, absent either a polling shift (or substantial error) in their favor or the defection of some party from the current bloc of governing parties, other than YB. If the Haredi (ultra-orthodox) parties joined them in government, that would be another 11.7 seats on the current polling estimate. So if we take the current opposition (minus Joint List), and add in YB and the two Haredi parties, we are at 45.5 + 4.5 + 11.7. Look, we made it to 61.7! A very bare majority, if the polls are spot-on. But not so fast.

While the Haredi parties have governed with left parties before, the broad center-left alliance the Economist is imagining includes at least one party that would be highly unlikely to go into government with the Haredi parties. Yesh Atid, currently polling at 12.7 seats, has as one of its core reasons for being the diminution of ultra-orthodox religious privileges in society; it successfully kept the Haredi parties out of government when it joined a coalition after the 2013 election. It is hard to imagine it agreeing to sit in a government with the Haredi parties (and vice versa). In fact, one of the reasons for the election being called when it was is that the government–again–failed to resolve the Haredi military draft issue, as required by the Supreme Court. It would not be any easier for a center-left-religious coalition to handle. Such a coalition could also be a problem for Meretz, which is a highly secular, left-wing party. YB, which gets most of its votes from the Russian community, is also closer to Yesh Atid on these issues, because of the official rabbinate’s rejection of many Russian immigrants’ Jewish status, although it has sat in nationalist-religious coalitions before, obviously.

Thus we see here already a reason why the Economist’s explanation for why the left won’t unite into a single alliance–“But none of the party leaders is prepared to serve as number two”–is insufficient. The opposition contains not only differences over who should be its leader, but also real divisions over what should be the course of action of the next government. A lot of the divisions may be personalities, but by no means all of them.

Nonetheless, let’s take the claim at face value. Let’s assume that there is an opposition alliance that, upon uniting, somehow not only does not lose any substantial share of its current voters because of pre-election compromises it has to make, but also is able to attract some voters from the right. It ends up with 48 seats (40%), while Likud has only 30 (25%). Is the most likely government–even with such a board alternative pre-electoral coalition able to start bargaining with the other parties–still one led by Likud? Yes, probably.

While it seems somewhat implausible that a pre-election alliance with 40% would be kept out of power if it was really 15 percentage points ahead of the largest list on the other side, any scenarios that have the center-left forming the next government have to get over the parliamentary arithmetic and real political issues mentioned already before they should be taken seriously.

Moreover, it is not as if the divisions on one side are occurring in a vacuum in which the other side does not exist or know what is happening. If, somehow, the center-left united and was polling at 40%, the right surely would respond with alliance-making of its own. While the various personalities in the smaller right-wing parties and in Likud clearly have a fair amount of contempt for one another, they arguably have fewer unbridgeable policy divisions than the center-left. In other words, if they were faced by a genuine threat of a united center-left, they’d almost certainly construct a more united right. We have seen it before: Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu put together a pre-election alliance in 2013, in part out of concern that Yesh Atid might surpass Likud in seats. While there is no procedural advantage to the largest party or list (just ask Tzipi Livni about the 2009 result), there is nonetheless political value in being first, or at least in not too far behind. Already, there are rumors that Likud and current center-right partner Kulanu may be negotiating a joint slate. (On current polling, that would combine for 34.3 seats, or just under 30%.)

Nonetheless, the bottom line is that, regardless of which list gets the most votes and seats, the government will be the one that can assemble a coalition consisting of at least 61 seats. And the simple fact is that advantage in votes falls to the broad right, not the left. There is no sense in which the divisions on the left are preventing it from winning. This is a proportional system, and so divisions are not costing any potential bloc seats, as they would in a majoritarian system.

But, hold on, what about that threshold? Is it possible that the left could deprive itself of seats because some of its parties fall below the threshold? If that happens, then it does indeed waste votes and potentially displace some seats to the right. So, yes, it is possible. The threshold is 3.25%, and at least one party on the center-left is below that (Livni’s HaTenua). However, Livni clearly is going to take part in some new alliance, now that she has been booted in an especially insulting fashion out of the Zionist Union that she formed with Labor before the 2015 election. Besides, this was not a claim the Economist piece made; it does not even mention the threshold.

One new party that has entered, Gesher (headed by current MK and YB-defector Orly Levy-Abekasis) is perilously close to the threshold. However, it is rather likely it will end up joining some pre-electoral bloc. There is also the newly registered party, Telem, of former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, who has declared he will not sit in a coalition with Netanyahu. Lists, including any alliances, need not be finalized till late February. (And, yes, this will be a general election in more ways than one.)

Moreover, it is not only the left that has to worry about the threshold. Netanyahu was sufficiently worried to propose lowering the threshold before the election. This was after the Knesset had passed the bill to set the election and “disperse” itself, but before the split in one of his current nationalist governing partners, Bayit Yehudi. The effort on the threshold failed, but it shows that it is not just the opposition that has divisions that could cost it.

The remnant of Bayit Yehudi is currently below the threshold. With 2.8 seats, it is about 1.2 short (the 3.25% threshold means usually the minimum size of a party in the Knesset will be 4 seats). It will probably align with one or more other very minor ultranationalist parties, but even in such an alliance, it could still be left out.

The defectors from Bayit Yehudi, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked, have formed a party to be called New Right. It is currently on 8.8 seats. It will seek to cement the Judea & Samaria settler vote and others opposed to any territorial concessions (helped by recruiting Caroline Glick to the list); it will remain a natural partner for Likud even as it seeks to differentiate itself both from Likud and from Bayit Yehudi. Yet even without the remnant of Bayit Yehudi passing the threshold, the current coalition partners are at about 59 seats. So now we are up against one other critical fact of the Israeli party system: there are various parties on the center-left that would be willing to join a Likud-led government. In fact, of all the parties on the center-left (not counting the Joint List, which will not be in any government), the only one I am sure would not join Likud is Meretz, and if we take Ya’alon at his word, whatever list he is on won’t back Netanyahu. (As mentioned before, it is also hard to see Yesh Atid in a government with the Haredi parties, but the party has been in a Likud-led coalition before.)

It just very hard to see a realistic scenario for a non-Likud government, absent a major shift in public preferences. Note that I have not even mentioned yet the legal troubles facing Netanyahu. Could that lead to a shift towards the center-left? Maybe. But don’t count on it. More likely, were the PM to be faced with charges before the election, he’d lose some votes to New Right. In fact, that could even be one of the reasons Bennett and Shaked made their move: their new party and its emerging platform could appeal broadly on the right in a way that the hardline orthodox religious (but not Haredi) components of Bayit Yehudi never would have.

To summarize, divisions on the left (or right) will not keep a camp from winning its full seat potential. Yes, if a party needed for the bloc to form a coalition majority falls below the threshold, that could displace seats to a rival bloc. However, parties that are at serious risk of not reaching 3.25% are likely to ally with other parties. It does not matter if the entire center-left unites; it still has less support in the public than the nationalist camp, and thus the latter would remain in stronger position to form a government. Moreover, it is not even clear that a united center-left would gain more votes than the separate parties can win, given the real divisions they reflect. To some degree this is true on the right, too (see the 2013 Likud Beitenu case), but the right is more cohesive as a potential (and current) government. Things could change between now and the election, but I would not count on it. Scenarios in which the current opposition will be the next government need a more credible story in their favor than just that the opposition needs to be more united.

Open lists in MMP: An option for BC and the experience in Bavaria

One of the options for electoral reform in British Columbia is mixed-member proportional (MMP) representation. The criteria for the potential system allow for a post-referendum decision (if MMP is approved by voters) on whether the party lists should be open or closed. The guide that was sent to all BC voters shows a mock-up of a ballot that looks like New Zealand’s, with closed lists. However, the provincial premier has stated that, if MMP is adopted, lists will be open.

When it comes to lists, it is my opinion that citizens will elect all of the members of the legislature. They will select names that are representative of their communities.

I remain uncertain about the value of open lists under MMP. Is it worth the extra ballot complexity? What additional gain does one get from having preference votes determine order of election for those winning compensatory seats? The MMP Review in New Zealand after the 2011 referendum (in which voters voted to keep MMP) looked at this question extensively. It came down firmly on the side of keeping lists closed.

Nonetheless, the statement by the premier suggests he believes the system is less likely to be chosen if voters expect the lists to be closed. And, given regional districts on the compensation tier, as explicitly called for in the system proposal, the lists would not be too long and thus the ballots not too complex.

It happens that there is one MMP system in existence in which the lists are open. Such a system has been used in Bavaria for quite some time. I actually proposed such a model in a post way back in 2005, quite early in the life of this blog. At the time I had no idea that what I had “invented” was, more or less, the existing Bavarian model.

Of course, Bavaria just had an election. In the thread on that election, Wilf Day offered some valuable insights into how the open lists worked. I am “promoting” selections from Wilf’s comments here. Indented text in the remainder of this post is by Wilf.

The Bavarian lists are fully “open,” and the ballot position has no bearing on the outcome, except to the extent the voters are guided by it, especially seen in voting for the number 1 candidate.

Of the 114 list seats, 31 were elected thanks to voters moving them up the list, while 83 would have been elected with closed lists.

Did the first on the list always get elected? Almost. In the region of Lower Bavaria, the liberal FDP elected only 1 MLA, and he had been second on their regional list.

Did the open lists hurt women? I did not check most results, but the SPD zippers their lists, and I noticed in Upper Palatinate the SPD elected 2 MLAs, list numbers 1 and 3 (two women). Conversely, in Middle Franconia the SPD elected 4 MLAs: 1, 2, 3, and 5 (three men).

Little known fact: a substantial number of voters in Bavaria, being used to voting in federal elections where their second vote is just for a party, blink at the Bavarian ballot, look for the usual space to vote beside the party name, it’s not there, so they put an X beside the party name anyway. A spoiled ballot? No, they count it as a vote for the party. Not a vote for the list as ranked, it does not count for the ranking or for any candidate, but it does count in the party count. Just like Brazil, where a vote for the party is not a vote for the list ranking, except Bavaria does not publicize the option of voting for the party.

Among the more interesting new Free Voter MLAs:

Anna Stolz, lawyer, Mayor of the City of Arnstein; she had been elected Mayor in 2014 as the joint candidate of the Greens, SPD, and Free Voters; the local Greens said they were very proud of her as Mayor. The Free Voter delegates meeting made her number 5 on the state list, but the voters moved her up to second place as one of the two Free Voter MLAs from Lower Franconia.

From Upper Bavaria, the capital region, list #12 was Hans Friedl, with his own platform: “a socially ecologically liberal voice, an immigration law based on the Canadian model, no privatization of the drinking water supply, a clear rejection of the privatization of motorways”). The voters moved him up to #8, making him the last of 8 Free Voters elected in that region.

Note: the comments are excerpted, and the order of ideas is a little different from where they appear in the thread. I thank WIlf for his comments, and for his permission to make them more prominent.

Brazil’s open list is (a little bit of) a hybrid now

Brazil is a classic case of open-list proportional representation (OLPR): lists win seats in proportion to their collective votes in a district (state), but candidates within the list are ordered solely according to preference votes obtained as individuals. These rules can result in individual candidates elected with very small preference-vote totals.

For the most recent Brazilian election, a new provision has gone into force. There is now a threshold on preference votes that candidates must obtain to be elected. This means that, in a very technical sense, a hybrid element has been brought into the Brazilian system. However, the provision is not the usual hybrid seen in “preferential list” systems, whereby seats not filled on preference votes are filled instead according to a party’s (or coalition’s) pre-determined rank. That hybrid format is what is typically called a flexible list or a semi-open list. However, Brazilian lists remain unranked, except via the preference votes.

Rather, in Brazil, a list that has an insufficient number of candidates with above-threshold preference votes forfeits those seats to other lists in the district. The threshold is set at 10% of the electoral quota, which is a Hare quota (1/M, where M is district magnitude).

This provision changed the allocation of 8 seats. Given a Chamber of Deputies with over 500 seats, we should not exaggerate the significance of the change, although of course, some other parties might have adjusted either their nomination behavior or their “intra-party vote management” practices (defined below) to avoid being hit by the threshold.

The Chamber’s website has an article regarding the seat shifts, and a table with the details (in Portuguese). The PSL, which is the party of the likely next president, Jairo Bolsonaro, won 7 fewer seats than it would have without the threshold. All these seats were in São Paulo, which is the highest-magnitude district in Brazil (M=70). The threshold there is thus 0.143% of the votes cast in the state. The Novo list in Rio Grande do Sul (M=31) also lost 1 seat due to the intra-list threshold. (Novo, meaning “New”, is a small liberal party.)

In São Paulo, the seven PSL candidates who were not eligible to take seats the list otherwise would have won had vote totals ranging from 19,731 to 25,908. They were replaced by candidates on six different lists with preference votes ranging from 56,033 to 92,257, suggesting the replacements had, on average, about three times the votes of the forfeiting candidates. (The party that picked up two of these seats was the Democrats.) In Rio Grande do Sul, the seat Novo forfeited would have been won by a candidate with 11,003 votes, but was instead filled by a candidate the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB, not to be confused with the PT of Lula) who had 69,904 votes, a preference-vote total 6.35 times greater than that of the forfeiting candidate.

As is clear from the vote totals of those who lost under this provision and those who gained, if the intention was to prevent candidates with marginal personal followings from riding in on the “coattails” of strong list-pullers (whose popularity increases the votes of the collective list), then the reformers can declare “mission accomplished”.

I am personally quite excited by this provision, which I had missed when summarizing minor changes made to the electoral law in 2017, because I once wrote up a proposal for just such a hybrid. It is in some text that was going to be part of one of the chapters in Votes from Seats, but Rein Taagepera and I decided it was not directly germane to the book and left it out. The chapter it would have been part of compares OLPR to the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) with respect to vote shares of first and last winners, and regarding the extent to which parties do (or do not) manage their intra-party competition.

Managing intra-party competition refers to parties doing one or both of: (1) restricting the number of candidates nominated, or (2) intervening in the campaign in an effort to shift votes from non-viable candidates to viable ones.

Under SNTV, these intra-party competition-management practices are critical because the total number of seats a party (or set of cooperating parties) can elect is entirely dependent on how many individual candidates it has whose votes are in the top-M vote totals in the district. Under OLPR, parties have no incentive to do this, if their goal is simply to maximize list seats–a list under OLPR can never displace seats to another list due to having “too many” candidates or having the candidates’ vote totals be widely unequal. (Parties may have other reasons to care about which candidates win, and multiple parties running in alliance face an SNTV-like conundrum in that they are competing with one another inside the list to get their candidates into the top s, where s is the number of seats won by the list. But these are separate problems, and the latter is a problem covered in Votes from Seats).

The proposal I drafted was a hybrid of OLPR and SNTV (unlike flexible lists, which are a hybrid of OLPR and closed-list PR). A threshold would be set on preference votes, and if a list won more seats, via application of the inter-list allocation rule, than it had candidates over the threshold, it would forfeit these seats. Any such forfeited seats would go into an “SNTV pool” to be be won by the otherwise unelected candidates with the highest preference-vote totals, independent of which list they had run on. My intention in devising this proposal was to encourage parties to be more active in managing their intra-party competition–taking some aspects of SNTV as beneficial–in order to make victory by candidates with marginal personal popularity less likely. (I would have set the threshold a little higher than 10% of a Hare quota.)

The article on the Chamber website is not clear on the precise rule now used in Brazil for deciding on the replacement candidates. In any case, it certainly has a similar effect to my proposal. (From a comment by Manuel at the earlier thread, it seems the forfeited seats are assigned proportionally rather than SNTV-like.) I can’t claim credit, as there is no way any Brazilian official saw my unpublished proposal. But I am pleased that some such a provision has been adopted somewhere.

Thanks to Dr. Kristin Wylie (on Twitter) for calling my attention to this article.