Recommended interview in Spiegel Online with Timothy Snyder (historian, Yale), Konstanty Gebert (Polish journalist), and Anton Shekhovtsov (Ukrainian political scientist).
Just some Crimea, Ukraine, voting turnout figures for perspective…
2004 runoff (Yushchenko defeats Yanukovych): 1.16 million.
2007 national legislative election (Yanukovych’s Party of Regions wins a plurality, though only 34%, nationwide): <850k.
2010 presidency (Yanukovych beats Tymoshenko): I can’t find raw number of votes, but turnout in Crimea is <50%, lowest in Ukraine.
Keep these less-than-impressive trends in Crimea voting turnout, even as Putin’s allies gain more power over time, in mind as Crimea’s “referendum” approaches.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation have represented, at various times, the only two examples I know of using a single-nationwide district with a magnitude greater than the 150 used in the Netherlands* and Slovakia. (Israel’s single district has M=120, Namibia’s M=72.) [But see JD’s comment for an intermediate example.]
As it happens, both Ukraine and Russia have used the same magnitude, 450, with closed lists, when they have had the single-national district. For Ukraine, such a system was used in 2006 and 2007; for Russia, 2007 and 2011. By contrast, in 1998, 2002, and 2012, Ukraine used a mixed-member majoritarian system (225 M=1 districts, and a nationwide non-compensatory M=225 district), as did the Russian Federation in post-Soviet elections before 2007.
Nationwide closed lists could have the effect of biasing representation towards the capital and other major cities, given the (potential) control of the lists by the central party leadership, and the absence of institutional imperative to offer regional or personalized representation. On the other hand, they could encourage parties to present candidates from even those regions where they are not strong, because a vote anywhere counts towards the party’s overall seat total, and because even in closed lists the presence of candidates from a region might signal to voters in the region that the party is responsive to their needs. In the only study I know of in the political science literature to address such questions, Latner and McGann find some bias towards the most important cities, but also an over-representation of peripheral regions in Israel and the Netherlands.
What about Ukraine? The pattern could be different in a much larger country, with clear regional divides in its politics. A blog post by Erik Herron, Univ. of Kansas, and one of my “Party Personnel” collaborators, offers interesting data on candidate and MP residency in the 2007 election.
Key point regarding 2007 winners:
Kyiv residency is dominant, accounting for more than half of all elected deputies. The Party of Regions is better represented through the reported residency of its elected deputies in some eastern areas (e.g., Donetsk) and the opposition is better represented in western areas (e.g., BYuT in Galicia). But, parties can also claim elected deputies who report residency in “enemy” territory.
Meanwhile, Russian Federation president Vladimir Putin today signed into law a return of his country’s electoral system to the mixed-member system. While the article is not explicit about the relation of the two tiers, I assume it will again be MMM (non-compensatory). Given the decline in the standing of the ruling United Russia, it makes sense that Putin would prefer a move towards a system that is both disproportional and favorable to “independents” who have local bases of support that exceed the popularity of the ruling party’s label. In this respect, it would be identical to the change in Ukraine prior to the 2012 election. That change worked strongly in favor of the Putinist forces of that country, buying them time to acquire the finest in home furnishings.
Now that Russia is moving back to MMM, and Ukraine is moving on from the Yanukovych/Party of Regions era, maybe Ukraine will go back to the pure PR system. If they ask me, I certainly would not recommend the single national district, however. Either districted PR, without too much variation in magnitude, or MMP would be my advice.
* In a very technical sense, the Netherlands has districts for nomination purposes. But for all practical purposes, it is a single district. It also allows preference voting for candidates on the list (though list ranks are more important), as does Slovakia, and as Israel does not. Russian and Ukrainian lists have always been closed, as are Namibia’s, to the best of my knowledge.
The deal signed earlier today in Ukraine calls for a return to the constitution instituted after the Orange Revolution protests (but later reversed). Those provisions significantly weakened the presidency–mainly by giving the president essentially no discretion in the choice of a prime minister, who was defined as the candidate of the legislative majority. On the other hand, the president under that constitution still retained control over key ministries, such as interior and defense, as well as a veto requiring two thirds to override. So the protesters are right to be skeptical, even if this is a big concession by President Yanukovych.
The agreement also mentions reforms to electoral laws, but does not clearly address the electoral system itself, which is obviously critical inasmuch as it determines how votes are translated into seats in empowering the very legislative majority that would appoint the PM. And, as I noted before, the current system is highly disproportional and personalistic, and these features allowed the pro-Yanukovych bloc to win a majority, counting pro-Yanukovych “independents” (bearing no party label), despite the president’s Party of Regions having barely a quarter of the votes. Of course, with the renewed mobilization of the opposition, it is less clear who would benefit from the current system’s disproportionality, but the opposition would seem to have a clear interest in a return to the party-list system used in 2006 and 2007. And that system’s proportionality would presumably offer the pro-Yanukovych forces a hedge against possible voter retributions whenever the new legislative election is held.
The agreement also only specifically refers to early presidential elections.
Obviously a situation still in flux.
The mass protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities are reminiscent of the Orange Revolution of November-December, 2004, when protests were critical to overturning the fraudulent official victory for the candidate of the old establishment, Viktor Yanukovych. Those protests succeeded in getting a re-vote of the presidential election runoff, which was won by Viktor Yushchenko. Now, nine years later, protesters are calling on Yanukovych, elected president in 2010 to succeed Yushchenko, and his cabinet to resign. The trigger for the protests appears to be the government’s decision not to sign an agreement with the European Union. But aren’t the protests now against a legitimately elected president and parliament?
It depends on what one means by “legitimate”–a word I discourage my students from ever using in my presence. If we compare the current parliament, the product of the most recent national election in Ukraine (28 October 2012), to that elected in 2007, some important qualifications to the electoral standing of the current government and its legislative support become obvious. Yanukovych is the head of the Party of Regions. Consider the following data:
Note that the total valid votes are lower in 2012 than in 2007. In addition, the vote percentage for Regions declined from 2007 to 2012, yet it won ten more seats. Its greater success in turning votes into seats in 2012 is entirely a product of a change in the electoral system, from pure nationwide proportional (with 3% threshold) in 2007 to a mixed-member majoritarian (or parallel) system in 2012. In the more recent election, the Regions won only 72 of the 225 nationwide proportional seats, but it bagged a bare majority of the nominal-tier seats (113 of 225), which are elected by plurality in single-seat districts. In addition, 49 of the nominal-tier seats were won by independents, and most of them are Yanukovych supporters who did not run under the Regions (or any) label. With the Regions-labelled winners and the Regions-supporting independents, the Yanukovych bloc rises to a majority. (Votes totals here refer to party list votes; I do not have a nationwide aggregation of the nominal-tier votes available.*)
Thus the electoral system change was critical to the success of Yanukovych’s bloc in the current parliament. It lost votes, but gained seats, even if we look only at the seats won by those bearing the party label, but even more so if we include the pro-Regions independents. Thus the MMM system benefited the Party of Regions via both its majoritarian and its nominal (candidate-based) features, relative to the pure party-list system in use in 2007.
Whether that makes Yanukovych’s parliamentary majority “legitimate” or not, I will leave to the reader’s judgment. But this electoral-system perspective demonstrates a key basis for the opposition’s claims that Regions does not represent the country at large.
What about Yanukovych himself? He was, after all, elected president in 2010. Consider the following from the runoff votes:
So, yes, he won a majority in 2010. But with fewer votes than his losing total in 2004. Of course, those who did not vote for his runoff opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko, have only themselves to blame for not showing up at the polls. And we can also blame them for failing to coordinate in the single-seat districts in 2012 to beat a ruling party that was so unpopular it won only 30% of the (list) votes. But it is not as if the protesters are facing off against a government with a broad mandate from the electoral process.
* UPDATE. Actually, I do have access to the nominal-tier results. Somehow I neglected another page at Adam Carr’s site where this information is available (national aggregate and regional, though not individual districts). And the Party of Regions had an even smaller vote share in the nominal tier than for party lists: 27.7%. That’s right, it won a majority of the 225 plurality contests on not quite two sevenths of the votes. “Others”, which would be mostly independents, combined for a third of the votes. The second largest party, All Ukrainian Fatherland, and which managed 25.5% of the list votes, had only 16.9% of the nominal votes. It now gets even easier to see why Yanukovych and his supporters wanted to change to a system that diminished the role of party-label voting and enhanced that of candidate factors.
Interfax reports that the opposition parties in Ukraine have agreed to a ‘one constituency – one candidate’ principle, under which they will not compete against one another in the single-seat districts.
Although the headline of the story says the parties have agreed to “form single list”, that may not be correct. They may still be presenting separate party lists for the seats allocated by proportional representation, although it is not clear.
The behavior in the single-seat constituencies is, however, precisely what we would anticipate under the MMM system that is being restored this year. Because (presumably) half the seats will be allocated to the plurality winner in each of (225) single-seat districts, and because the list-PR seats are not compensatory, parties that have some common interests would have a strong incentive to form a pre-electoral coalition. In doing so, they would be following the precedent of parties in Japan’s and Hungary’s MMM systems, which joined into two blocs to avoid the “spoiler” problem. (In those cases, the parties generally have presented separate party lists.)
For the 2006 and 2007 legislative elections, Ukraine used an exclusively closed-list PR system in one nationwide district. Prior to that, it had been MMM for 2002 and 1998. At that time, there was little coordination in the single-seat districts, many of which were won by non-party candidates. Now the party system is much more developed–aided in large part by the two PR elections.
The news story also indicates that the parties promise they would form a government together if they won a majority jointly. If they did so, it would lead to a potentially lengthy case of cohabitation, as the presidency is not up for election till 2015.
The legislative elections are set for 28 October.
(There are several earlier entries here on Ukraine’s elections and the former electoral system. Just click the country name at the top, and go a-scrolling.)
This is the Golden Rose Synagogue, or what is left of it.
The photo (taken by me) is from 2005. Built in the late 16th century, the Golden Rose was once one of the most important centers of Jewish life in the old Austro-Hungarian empire. It is located in Lviv, Ukraine (formerly Lvov, Poland, and before that Austrians and the Yiddish-speaking Jews knew the city as Lemberg). The ruins, as well as the near-absence of Jews in Lviv today, are a legacy of the Shoah (Holocaust).
I don’t know who is right, but this a key cultural landmark, and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. It needs to be preserved.
The story has me wondering about the safety of another incredible synagogue that we saw, the 17th century Pink Synagogue of Zhovka (which is near Lviv).
Obviously, this building is far more intact. Just as obviously, it is (or was in 2005) in a very serious state of disrepair.
I went to look up “pink synagogue zhovka” in Google, and the first hit is my own Laderafrutal travel page! I could not find anything about its current condition, six years since I was there. Maybe no news is good news.