I am sharing the above post by Nathan Batto at Frozen Garlic because it says so much that is of interest to readers of this blog. Nathan explains why the result is not quite divided government and almost certainly will not produce cohabitation, and thus the president–while lacking a legislative majority and in fact facing a KMT plurality–still likely will control the executive (via appointing an ally as premier) and not be too seriously checked.
There is also a comment from me, which I will reproduce here:
On the executive scenarios, I agree, from my comparative executives perspective. Taiwan has the president-parliamentary variant of semi-presidentialism, which gives the president much more leverage over appointment of a premier and cabinet formation.
At least as of 2009 or so, when David Samuels and I finished our book, Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers, there was only one case of cohabitation in a president-parliamentary system. It was in Sri Lanka, and I do not remember the particulars. We discuss the Taiwan cases of “divided government” (a party or pre-electoral alliance opposed to the president winning a majority in the legislature).
However, a case of divided government arising from a concurrent election, had it happened in this election, might be exactly a scenario in which cohabitation would occur. So I agree with you.
(We define cohabitation very strictly: president and premier from opposing parties, and the president’s party not in the cabinet.)
Fruits and Votes 