Dylan Matthews, writing in the Washington Post, argues that monarchy makes democracy stronger.
As noted by Ed, who tipped us off to this item in another thread on “ceremonial” heads of state, the piece is above average analytics for a newspaper column. Perhaps faint praise, especially once Nate Silver leaves the NYT, but true, its flights of whimsy notwithstanding.
The piece contains a chart based on data from Petra Schleiter and Edward Morgan-Jones with–get this–an actual link to a political science journal article, though it is gated, of course. The finding that Matthews highlights is that:
in constitutional monarchies, the most common result of governments falling is the calling of new elections. If the old government wasn’t working for whatever reason, the people are given the opportunity to elect another one. In republics, by contrast, it’s more common for there to be a non-electoral replacement, where the existing parliament forms a new governing coalition.
I think this exaggerates somewhat the impact of constitutional monarchy; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones consider many other variables.
There are a few factual errors in Matthews’s article that should be noted, even if they do not necessarily undermine his argument: It is not always the case that wherever the head of government is a prime minister there is a separate head of state (president or monarch). In South Africa, the head of government may be called “president” but is in fact a prime minister (i.e. the head of the winning party/coalition in the legislature, subject to the latter’s confidence). Interwar Estonia had a fused prime minister/head of state. Second, Germany, Israel, Italy, and India do not belong in a list of countries with an “elected president whose powers are mainly ceremonial.” While the text does not say directly or popularly elected, it certainly implies it. (“Either the public or some legislative body selects the president” conflates a lot!)
So, are constitutional monarchies more democratic? Maybe, but I doubt the relationship is causal. And I doubt Matthews actually believes it is, either. But the piece is a good read.
Fruits and Votes 
A proportion of the electorate have an authoritarian disposition.
It may be the case that it’s better to provide people who have an authoritarian disposition with a magnificent representative of the state that they can focus on, rather than a Trump. A ceremonial president or governor-general is not nearly as strong a barrier as the sad case of Modi’s India shows, especially if they are appointed or indirectly elected.
Even Australia has seen strenuous efforts by all prime ministers since John Howard to disappear the governor-general. One of the rare occasions that Howard’s cabinet overruled him was a submission for legislation that would make any federal support for the 2000 Sydney Olympics contingent on Howard getting to preside over the opening and closing ceremonies. Julia Gillard repeatedly referred to herself as head of state. Tony Abbot, an uber-monarchist, ignored repeated calls from government house to present himself to the governor-general and resign and eventually resigned by email. Scott Morrison surrounded himself with flags, a ceremonial guard and a band when he departed or returned on international trips.
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Alan, did you remember this post, or have to search for it? I ask because when I saw the note of the comment on this post, I did not remember it at all.
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I searched for constitutional monarchy because I thought it was an interesting point.
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The idea that “authoritarian” citizens are incapable of understanding that a “magnificent representative of the state” does not actually influence policy under a constitutional monarchy strikes me as somewhat unrealistic. The key difficulty assessing this argument is that most constitutional monarchies are prosperous liberal European states neighbouring equally stable republics, but if we look at Thailand, the fact that Thaksin Shinawatra was a mere Prime Minister does not appear to have sufficiently distracted his opponents from the fact that he was running the country.
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It would probably be best for you to present a coherent argument rather than relying on quote marks around ‘authoritarian’ and a bald assertion of silliness.
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I’m quite happy to flesh it out a bit more, but was relying on the definition of authoritarian above. Someone with such a personality would presumably have a number of concrete political aims as a result of these traits, such as the restriction of liberties for those in society they don’t consider right-thinking or moral. A constitutional monarch, by definition, cannot achieve these concrete political aims. An authoritarian citizen who wished to impose their preferences on others would therefore have to engage in electoral or extra-constitutional politics if they wanted to achieve their aims.
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The authoritarian predisposition has been a serious object of study since Adorno published The Authoritarian Personality (1950). The concept is well-defined and supported by empirical evidence. Your description of citizens with an authoritarian predisposition does not reflect the research.
Such people are the core of the Trump movement in the US. They have persuaded themselves, against all evidence, that:
They do not sound much like the careful constitutional analysts that you describe. The core of the authoritarian predisposition is:
I’m not particularly concerned with the constitutional details of a particular monarchy, merely the point that mighty leaders who must ritually defer to a monarch face a challenge persuading their followers of their mightiness.
In my first comment I wrote there may be a case. I think it’s an interesting idea that merits investigation, not an open and shut case.
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It’s an interesting idea that merits investigation and I’m trying to investigate it. I just don’t really understand why people who believe in “a mighty leader who should be largely free of checks and balances” who will “restrain the multifarious others who do not belong to the group” would necessarily see a constitutional monarch who can by definition do neither of those things as some sort of locus of national power.
Trump voters may not be careful constitutional scholars, but they can make their way to the voting booth (or the postbox) on election day and vote for someone who actually exercises power. Thailand’s authoritarians have used defence of their (nominally constitutional) monarch as an excuse to overthrow multiple elected governments. Malaysia has a healthy Islamist political faction while simultaneously retaining a constitutional monarchy.
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As much as I’d like to accept any excuse for constitutional monarchy, I can’t help but observe that Italy’s monarchy did nothing to prevent the rise of Mussolini. I also wonder what kind of monarchy would appease both right wing and left wing authoritarians.
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Election-rigging was pandemic under the Italian monarchy. A famous letter from the minister of the interior to a prefect in Emilia Romagna complains bitterly, not that several cows had been allowed to vote in Predappio in 1893, but that they had been allowed to vote for the opposition.
Fascist Italy rook election-rigging to a whole new level. Many Italians were shocked when the king appointed Mussolini as prime minister in 1922. Sadly, they would not get a free and fair vote on the issue until 1946.
The Fascists relied on intimidation, coercion. and informational autocracy to control elections until 1929, when the electoral system was changed to provide an up or down vote on a single nationwide list, The Fascist list was invariably the only list on the ballot.
Describing Fascist Italy as a constitutional monarchy is drawing a very, very long bow.
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What about Ireland that has a directly elected ceremonial presidency? Of course the President had a position on Ireland’s drift toward NATO, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/19/ireland-debate-military-neutrality-president-michael-d-higgins-government
Does that mean a ceremonial head of state should have no opinions? Other than in the case of refusing to dissolve parliament if the government loses it’s majority.
It seems silly that a monarchy would have no opinions as well and is above the fray of partisan politics. It is akin to the Eurovision Song Contest which is supposedly apolitical, but is blankly political.
Eurovision Song Contest is something that should be analyzed on this blog.
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The difference between an elected president and a monarch is that the elected president has legitimacy which a monarch, in the absence of general public acceptance of the divine right of kings, lacks. Monarchs may have personal opinions, but they lack a sound basis for expressing those opinions or using them to make policy.
This probably explains why the silent ceremonial directly elected President is a relatively rare breed. Ireland, Singapore and Iceland are probably the best three examples, but both Ireland and Singapore have restricted contestation for the Presidency. The more common pattern appears to be even institutionally weak Presidents behaving as political actors.
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Yes, the cases where an elected president is “silent” are the exceptions demanding explanation. We should assume that popular election is itself empowering, barring certain conditions that may not be replicable in other contexts.
Rob’s question is a good one–should a ceremonial head of state have no opinions? There is a lot of variation here even if we confine ourselves to presidents who are not popularly elected. Israeli presidents have never been shy about wading into the fray on issues they considered big and important, but German presidents seem pretty invisible, to give two examples.
Leaving aside cases that are clearly not stable democracies (e.g., Thailand), the variation on this dimension among monarchs seems much less, but I can’t claim to be certain of that.
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The divine right of kings was a specifically Protestant doctrine that flourished relatively briefly in the Early Modern period. It was unknown before James VI and I of Scotland and England published The True Law of Free Monarchies (original title: The Trve Lawe of free Monarchies: Or, The Reciprock and Mvtvall Dvtie Betwixt a free King, and his naturall Subiectes). Although Scotland was Calvinist James drew most of his ideas from Lutheran texts on the role of the ‘godly prince’ who headed the church in Lutheran countries.
The later development of ideas of absolutism and enlightened despotism were an exercise in Enlightenment rationalism. Neither doctrine has any relationship to constitutional monarchy. Indeed the War of Three Kingdoms and the Glorious Revolution were specifically fought in opposition to James’ ideas.
The only contemporary relevance of the divine right of kings is the embarrassing nonsense written about Donald Trump by some Evangelical scholars and the even more embarrassing nonsense about Vladimir Putin uttered by the patriarch of Moscow.
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Small historical footnote: Henri I of France called James the wisest fool in Christendom.
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Yes, the fact that the public doesn’t believe that monarchs have any special rights or privileges (divinely ordained or otherwise) to influence public debate is a significant obstacle to constitutional monarchs engaging in politics.
On the question of indirectly elected ceremonial presidents, I suspect there’s probably some selection effects going on here. Indirectly elected presidents are selected by the same legislatures that choose the government – it seems likely that governments would tend to choose politically quiescent candidates who are unlikely to embarrass them. There are obviously exceptions here related to election timings and personality conflicts (the Slovak prime minister allegedly ordering the kidnapping of the president’s son in 1995 following disputes over privatisation is the most dramatic example I can think of), but it seems like a good general rule. Whether an indirectly elected president has weaker *normative* grounds on which to express their views is a separate question, I guess.
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First you invoked the relevance of the divine right of kings because you thought it was still a current feature of constitutional monarchies. Now you’re invoking the divine right of kings because you know it doesn’t. You’re not making a highly coherent argument.
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I said the same thing both times: as there is no public support for the idea that monarchs have any special right to interfere with or opine on politics by virtue of their position (call this the divine right of kings or don’t), monarchs in constitutional monarchies do not have the legitimacy to interfere with or opine on politics.
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The divine right of kings has a specific historical meaning. It does not apply in a constitutional monarchy.
Your argument so far consists of deprecatory quote marks applied to a concept that has a precise definition and is supported by strong empirical evidence, an allegation of silliness, invoking a historical concept to mean what you want it to mean instead of what it actually means, and insisting, contrary to Stenner’s finding, that people with an authoritarian disposition vote instrumentally when Stenner’s evidence is that they do not.
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Alan, I don’t really understand what you’re trying to disagree with me on any more , what “my argument” is supposed to be, or what the divine right of kings has to do with instrumental voting. Those were two different comments on two entirely different subjects. The divine right of kings does not apply in constitutional monarchies, which I’ve now said four times and is part of my point.
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You are descending to straw man arguments. I have not related the divine right of kings to instrumental voting nor suggested that constitutional monarchs should have anything but ceremonial functions.
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