I am just digesting the news. This is quite remarkable. Jacinda Ardern has been leader of the Labour Party for not even three months, and now she is about to be PM.
(Some of you have already been doing so, at the election thread.)
We are entering days of convergences. Over the next two days, the Jewish and Islamic new years and the first day of Autumn coincide. Then, on the weekend, we have the convergence of elections in the two countries that offer our best examples of mixed-member proportional (MMP) representation electoral systems: Germany and New Zealand. (Lest I be accused of hemispherism, let me hasten to note that in one of those countries, the election will be the day after the start of spring.)
In the case of Germany, which votes Sunday, there really has been no doubt for some time that the CDU/CSU alliance would place first, but it will be down from its 2013 result. There is also little doubt that the two parties that missed the 5% party-vote threshold in 2013 will clear it this time: the center-right FDP and the far-right AfD. The SPD, which briefly flirted with the lead in the polls some months after changing its leadership, looks like it may struggle to break 25% of the vote. The real question is what the coalition will be, after the election results are known.
I would expect the SPD to want a period of opposition to recollect itself after what looks sure to be another disappointing result for the party. Thus it may not be willing to renew the current CDU/CSU+SPD big coalition (what we should stop calling a grand coalition; my more direct translation of the German term is more apt). If the FDP has enough seats to combine with the CDU/CSU, we might see a return to the center-right combo that governed from 2009 to 2013, as well as in many past terms. There is just enough error in the projections from polling to allow for the possibility that this could be a viable combine. (Mouse over the numbers in the table at that link for the range of vote and seat projections for each party.)
However, the most likely result seems to me to be Jamaica! I will admit to rooting for this: CDU/CSU + FDP + Green. (The name refers to the parties’ colors.)
In New Zealand, the contest for Saturday’s election is much more uncertain. For months it seemed National, which heads the current multi-party governing arrangement, was cruising to another win. Then Labour changed its leader and surged (similar to the German pattern). By a few weeks ago, the two largest parties were running neck and neck, while the Greens stumbled badly and looked at risk of failing to clear the 5% party-vote threshold. This scenario was posing a potential difficult challenge for center-left voters: Do you vote Labour to bolster its formateur status (as the largest party, although there is no formal right of first attempt to the largest in New Zealand)? Or do you vote Green to ensure there is a viable partner for Labour other than Winston Peters and his New Zealand First (NZF) party? Given that the electoral system is MMP, you can do both: vote for Labour in your district (electorate) and vote Green on the list. However, while that might be a voter’s way of making a statement of preferred coalition, only the party vote affects the overall balance of seats in parliament. (Some exceptions to that statement, as I will get to below, but none likely relevant to the Labour-Green situation discussed here.)
In recent days, some polling suggests that National might be pulling ahead again. The result could be very close, and it could be a situation in which NZF is pivotal (although that may be less likely than it seemed some weeks ago). That is, assuming NZF makes it. The party has been tending downward and is hovering near 5%, as are the Greens . Here is where the electorate (district/nominal) vote comes in. The threshold provision for a party to participate in nationwide proportional allocation is 5% of party-list votes or one electorate. (Additional MPs elected beyond the electorate candidate are what I have termed “piggyback MPs“, not to be confused with that other MMP creature, the “shadow MP“.) The Greens do not have an electorate where they are viable, but NZF does.
Peters, the NZF leader, currently holds an electorate seat, Northland, having won it in a by-election in 2015. He is the party’s candidate again for the seat. If he retains it, his party would qualify for additional list seats, even if it fell below the 5% party-vote threshold.
The other electorate contests that matter include the one in Epsom, although it is not really a contest. The seat is safe for the one Act MP, David Seymour, who is quite certain to return. It is probably not likely that the Act party vote will be sufficient to earn the party a second seat, although I saw one projection a week or so ago that suggested it was possible. Act has been a governing partner with National since 2008.
Then there is Waiariki, one of the Maori set-aside seats. (Voters who claim Maori descent can choose to vote in their special Maori electorate or in the general electorate seat in which the reside.) Te Ururoa Flavell is fighting to hold the seat, which is the only way his party will retain a presence in parliament. That is quite a change for the party, which has been a National governing partner since 2008. In the past it has won as many as five electorate seats (in 2008) and in 2014 it had sufficient party votes to win a list seat for the first time, in addition to its win in Waiariki electorate. This time, it may end up with just one seat–or zero.
One electorate we know will not matter this time is Ohariu. United Future leader Peter Dunne resigned in August, after a 33-year career as an MP. This effectively kills the party, which has been a support partner to every government, whether led by Labour or National, since 2002. Only in 2002 did the party clear the party-vote threshold, and since 2008, Dunne has been its only member.
In an interesting twist on the Ohariu story, the Greens had initially decided not to contest the seat, in order to give the Labour candidate a chance to defeat Dunne and thereby knock a National partner out of the government-formation equation. When Dunne resigned, the Greens announced a candidate for the seat. With Dunne not running, there is no scenario in which this electorate will matter for the parliamentary balance, so there was no reason for the Greens not to have “local face” on the party (even though many of its voters will split their vote and give their electorate vote to the Labour candidate anyway). Running a candidate is thus another example of what I have called green contamination.
Two MMP elections in one weekend. Now that will be something to watch!
Since his election in 2015, Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte has done little that supporters of liberal democracy should admire. His program of extrajudicial killings and contemptuous attitude to the judicial institutions of the Philippines demonstrates that he is in many ways a dangerous figure for the country. However, it’s true that a stopped clock is right twice a day, and one of Duterte’s more positive ideas for the country has been a consistently expressed willingness to change the country’s political system, from the existing system of unitary presidentialism to a semi-presidential federal system.
In keeping with this principle, a group of Senators have presented a specific proposal for a dramatically revised new federal constitution. Having only given it a cursory examination, I responded positively-however, a more careful examination demonstrates several substantial issues with the draft.
The proposal would divide the Philippines into eleven states, with Manila City becoming a federally administered region. Only half of Duterte’s proposal would be implemented, though, as presidentialism is kept-the most substantial change to the structure of the now federal government would be a change to the Senate, which would go from being a twenty-four member body elected using MNTV in one nationwide district for six-year terms (with staggered elections to half of the chamber every three years) to a seventy-five member body elected with states acting as districts, nine senators per state, and three senators elected per state every two years.
In general, the Philippines has not been a positive example of presidentialism. Presidents have regularly been elected in fragmented races (Fidel Ramos was elected in 1992 with 24% of the vote), and the party system for the legislature is if anything more weak and fragmented, with fluid allegiances (best demonstrated by the numbers of President Duterte’s PDP-LABAN party going from two at the election to a comfortable majority afterwards).
The federal aspect of the constitution also leaves something to be desired. Governors are elected directly, with first-past-the-post for four-year terms. Initially, and somewhat unusually, state legislators are elected by local councils. Three are elected for each province, a truly astonishing degree of malapportionment. For example, in Central Visayas State, the province of Siquijor (pop. 96,000) will have the same three seats as Cebu (pop. 4.6 million). Three further members are elected: one for farming, one for fisheries, and one for senior citizens.
Indirect election by local councils becomes variable by state legislatures after the first election. It is left unclear as to whether states are able to amend the composition of their legislatures, or whether local councils are still able to recall members of state legislatures.
Weirdly enough, states can create ‘autonomous regions’ within their own territories, the powers of which are only vaguely defined. States also have exclusive power, strangely enough, over “trade…tourism…weights and measures” as well as “pilgrimages to places outside the Republic”, which, as JD pointed out to me, could allow corrupt state officials to be spirited away from federal police on fairly spurious grounds.
None of this is to say, of course, that the principles of federalism don’t make sense for the Philippines. As a large country with clear political diversity, it makes sense to devolve power from a potentially unrepresentative core. Nonetheless, the proposal put forward by the Senators risks creating equally unrepresentative state-level governments with a somewhat esoteric mix of powers. More work is needed, and presumably the plan will be looked at more carefully through the later process of the reform process.
In New Zealand’s MMP system, there are by-elections if there is a vacancy between general elections in a single-seat district. This is not a mandatory feature of MMP systems; Germany, for example, has no by-elections. A vacancy in a district is filled off the list of the party of the vacating member.
Nigel Roberts, a leading New Zealand expert on elections and electoral systems, writes in the Dominion Post that New Zealand should end the practice of by-elections. In making the case, he refers to a by-election in the constituency of Mt Albert, which is a safe Labour seat. The Labour Party’s candidate in the by-election, Jacinda Ardern, already is an MP, via the party list. Thus the effect of her winning (which she did) is simply to shift the type of mandate she has*, and have her replaced as a list MP by the next available candidate on the Labour list from the preceding election.
Roberts suggests adding a regional component to the lists in order to ensure that the replacement is from the same region as the district in which the vacancy has occurred.
A potential problem with the proposal is the fact that sometimes a by-election really does shift who controls a district and sometimes can even change the nationwide balance between parties (as happened in a recent case in Northland district). Roberts takes the position that this is better avoided, so as not to change potentially the majority for the government. “Party votes cast in general elections should make or break governments – not electorate votes cast in by-elections,” he says.
I am curious to know what readers think of the proposal.
* As well as, sadly, deprive us of my favorite case of a list MP “shadowing” the district-elected MP.
The moral of the story is: don’t leave work early.
“It was the first time since 1962 that a majority government has lost votes in the House of Representatives.”
The voters in Tasmania have pushed a Labor Senator up the ranks and she will be reelected ahead of other candidates of the party.
Under the old system, most voters cast ticket votes, making the order of election in any given party more closed list than open or STV. Now, voters can rank “below the line” without having to rank all candidates. (Alternatively, they can rank parties “above the line”.)
The article notes that Tasmanian voters have tended to vote below the line more than voters in other states, anyway (probably because they use STV for their state assembly).
There are also some strange ballot rankings above the line. ABC says, quoting Polling analyst Kevin Bonham:
I’ve seen cases like people voting One for the Shooter, Fishers and Farmers, and Two for the Animal Justice Party, two parties that are more or less totally opposed to each other in the views. I saw people voting for the Sex Party, then Family First – one exists to basically negate the other. People are viewing parties in quite a strange way.
Thailand will be holding a referendum on adopting a new constitution on August 7. A translation of this document is available here. The nation is currently ruled by a military junta, which took power from the elected government in May 2014. If the constitution is adopted, elections will be held in mid-2017 to choose a new civilian government (though that date has been pushed back a fair few times).
The document provides for a bicameral Thai parliament, as has been the norm for the nation’s numerous democratic constitutions. There is a Senate and a House of Representatives. One of the most substantial changes is that the Senate, which was half-elected and half-appointed by the King (I am unclear whether this was to take place on the advice of the government) under the 2007 constitution, and entirely elected under the 1997 one, will now be wholly appointed. This represents a return to pre-1997 practice.
While the Senate only has a delaying role on most legislation, passage at a joint sitting is required for certain ‘organic’ laws, like those on elections, the operation of the Constitutional Court, and the specific method for choosing Senators. This will become especially important in the first term of government, as the first Senate is to be appointed on the advice of the members of the junta.
The House of Representatives is the larger and more powerful of the two houses. As was hinted at by the drafters of the new document, it is to be elected using mixed-member proportional representation, though with closed lists and a remarkably small list tier (150 list/350 constituency).
When this proposal was first put about, I did some simulations of what the House would have looked like following the 2011 election had MMP been used. These estimates are based off a smaller list tier (the size of the one used under MMM in 2011). Any increase in the size of the House is due to overhang.
The key loser would be the populist Pheu Thai party, strongly opposed by the coup leaders and the winner would be the Democrat Party, which is considered to have the tacit support of the coup leaders. This would not necessarily be an unfair advantage (given it would give the Democrats a somewhat closer share of seats to their nationwide support), but it would be an advantage nonetheless.
MMP is specifically entrenched in the document. Amendment procedures have also changed; while past documents have allowed a majority of members of the House to make amendments, the new document will require 20% support from opposition parties to make amendments. Needing a super-majority isn’t unusual internationally, but not many constitutions contain quite so many specific electoral provisions as Thailand’s.
What impact increased proportionality will have on Thailand’s democracy is not entirely clear. On one hand, it could require governments to form broader coalitions, which might reduce confrontation in Thai politics and thus less resort to extra-constitutional means. On the other, it could lead to a fragmented House and weak, revolving-door civilian governments, like those that existed before 1997.
It is also worth noting that the elections scheduled for mid-2017, if they take place then, will be held under a law written and approved by the current military-appointed legislature.
Regardless of this constitution, Thailand has clearly got serious problems with military intervention. Previous Constitutions of a similar nature to this one ended in failure. It is unclear whether this one will be any better, though I see it as unlikely.
As I type this, the polls in Australia’s House and Senate elections will be opening over the next several hours. Feel free to discuss or post links here.
There may be a conventional wisdom among people who study comparative electoral systems that the Alternative Vote (also known as Instant Runoff or Majority Preferential) tends to suppress the effective number of parties, compared to plurality (First Past the Post, or FPTP). Or maybe it is just me, but I will admit to having such a notion. After all, Australia is a pretty strict two-party system, isn’t it?
The correct way to approach the question of whether AV means a higher or lower effective number of parties (N) than FPTP is to ask: What we should expect N to be, given the country’s seat product?
As explained by Taagepera (2007) and further elaborated and tested by Li and Shugart (2016), the seat product is a country’s mean district magnitude (M), times its assembly size (S). The Seat Product Model says that the effective number of seat-winning parties (Ns) tends to be the sixth root of this product: Ns=(MS)1/6.
The model is logical, not a mere product of empirical regression work, although regression tests confirm it almost precisely (Li and Shugart, 2016).
When all districts elect just one member, thus M=1, the Seat Product is just the assembly size, S. Hence we take the sixth root of S to get an expectation for Ns. What if we do this for Australia’s House of Representatives? We get an expectation of 2.31.
The actual Ns for Australia’s elections since 1984, the year S was increased from 125 to 148 (subsequently it has increased to 150, a minor change) is… 2.53. However, I believe that figure (I am using Gallagher’s Election Indices) treats the Coalition parties as one in elections before 2010.
In the two most recent elections, Ns has been 2.92 and 3.23. The notes to Gallagher’s Election Indices indicate that for these elections the Liberal Party, the Nationals, and the Liberal National Party of Queensland are treated as separate parties. In my opinion they should be so treated, although I suppose one could have a debate about that.
The actual mean is thus above the expectation for a hypothetical FPTP of the same size assembly. If we use the figure of 2.53, it is obviously not much higher than 2.31 (the ratio is 1.10). However, if we consider the value, at least in recent elections, to be around 3.0, it is about 1.30 times the expectation value.
Contrast this with the UK, where elections of the same period (1987-2010) have a mean Ns=2.30. This is just what we expect for FPTP, right? Not much over 2.0. Not so fast! The UK has a huge assembly, and with S=650 (aprpox., as it varies over the period), we should expect Ns=2.94. The UK actually has one of the more under-fragmented assemblies, according to the Seat Product Model, with this recent-period average being only 78% of expectation.
So how about Canada, where AV is one of the potential reforms being considered? Over a similar period (1984-2011) we get Ns=2.63. With S around 300 during this time, we should get Ns=2.59. So Canada pretty much nails the expectation of the model.
So, should we expect Ns to go down if Canada were to adopt AV, as (what I characterized as) the conventional wisdom would have it? Or should we expect it to go up?
I would not be inclined to say ‘down’. I will just leave it at that for now.
Four new posts are up today, each of them by either Alan or Henry. They are part of a series that begins now on the upcoming election in Australia (plus an update on Bougainville).
So scroll down, and enjoy. Thank you, Alan and Henry, for being F&V’s correspondents Down Under!
As most of my readers will know, Australia’s federal election campaign has begun, with polling day scheduled for July 2. The campaign has been rather uneventful so far, but there is one interesting event that could take place in South Australia.
Nick Xenophon is a Senator from South Australia. His political career started when he was elected to the South Australian Legislative Council (which is elected eleven members every three years, using the single transferable vote) as a candidate opposed to ‘pokies’ (slot machines). He received 2.86% of the vote, which represented only about a third of a quota; nonetheless, he received group ticket preferences from seven other parties, and was elected.
During his six-year term, he developed substantial popularity in the state, and when his seat came up for election in 2006, his ‘Independent Nick Xenophon’ ticket received 20.6% of the vote for the lower house, only six points behind the Liberal Party. This allowed him to be elected, as well as his running mate Ann Bressington.
Following this result, he decided to run for the Australian Senate in 2007, as an independent candidate. He won a seat with 14.8% of the primary vote: just above a quota.
The results of that election saw the Labor Party win a majority in the House of Representatives, and form government. However, the party was relatively weak in the Senate; they had only 32 seats, to 37 for the Liberal/National coalition. With 39 votes needed to pass legislation, this meant that Xenophon shared the balance of power with five Green Senators and one member of the religious conservative Family First Party.
This meant that Senator Xenophon was in a position to heavily influence government legislation. And, as a Senator without a particularly strong ideological affiliation, he used this power to direct Federal funding to South Australian projects; for example, when the government needed to pass an economic stimulus bill, Senator Xenophon blocked it at first, in order to increase funding for conservation of the Murray-Darling River.
Following the 2010 election, the Labor Party lost its majority in the House of Representatives, but was able to come to agreements with a number of independent members of the House to hold onto a majority. However, in the Senate, Labor and the Greens together had a majority, allowing the government to avoid negotiation with the other Senators.
Despite this reduction in his influence, Xenophon was easily re-elected in 2013, securing 24.9% of the vote, narrowly beating the Labor Party. Such a vote put him well on the way to a second seat; however, most parties (including Labor and the Greens) submitted group tickets against his running mate, allowing Family First’s Bob Day to be elected off 3.76% of the primary vote.
Much has changed in the Senate since then. The 2013 election brought the Liberal/National coalition to power, but the government only won 33 seats in the Senate, meaning that they needed six other Senators to pass a bill. Assuming Labor and Green opposition to a bill, this meant that Xenophon and two other Senators could block a bill.
During this parliamentary term, Xenophon announced he would form a national political party. While he had registered a party before his 2013 election called the ‘Nick Xenophon Group’ (in order to have his name appear above the line on the ballot paper) it only contested the Senate in South Australia. In 2014, the party was turned into the Nick Xenophon Group, which would contest elections outside South Australia and without Xenophon as a candidate.
The government also made substantial changes to the electoral law towards the end of this parliamentary term. The electoral system for the Senate was changed from the single transferable vote with compulsory preferences, where voters could either number every single candidate, or vote for a party’s ticket of preferences. Large numbers of candidates mean that most voters voted for a party’s ticket of preferences. This system meant that small parties were able to swap preferences to other small parties with very strong preference flows, allowing candidates to win with very small shares of the vote. Dr Kevin Bonham sums up the issues with the system very well here.
The system was replaced early this year, following an agreement between the Liberal/National government, the Greens and Xenophon. It was replaced by an optional preferential system, where voters can either vote preferentially above the line (with a preference for a party representing a vote for the candidates of that party in order) or for individual candidates below the line.
Shortly following this change, the government announced that they would recall Parliament in order to put several industrial relations bills to a vote. This was the second time these bills had been put to the Senate (they had been rejected the first time), and if they were rejected again, the government would have a trigger for a double dissolution (an election for all members of both houses of Parliament). As it turned out, the bill was blocked, and a double dissolution was called.
The Xenophon Team has been announcing candidates for selected House of Representatives seats, and will run a Senate ticket in every state. The fact that this election is a double dissolution will have a number of advantages for this party.
First of all, the threshold for election in the rest of the country will be halved, as twelve seats will be up for election. This will make it easier for minor parties of all sorts to be elected, and Xenophon’s party is minor outside of South Australia.
Second of all, and more importantly, it will allow Xenophon himself to be attached to the party’s Senate ticket in South Australia for all twelve Senators, rather than just six. Why is this important?
Well, when Xenophon was re-elected to the South Australian Legislative Council in 2006, his ticket won two seats. While his original running mate turned out to be a disaster, the replacement for his seat (John Darley) ran for re-election in the 2014 election as the “Independent Nick Xenophon Team”. He received only 13% of the primary vote, but held his seat.
From that result, I don’t think it’s unreasonable to say that there is a dropoff in support for Xenophon-affiliated candidates when Xenophon himself is not on the ballot, and thus him being on the ballot for all Senators could boost the party’s representation somewhat. While this may be extrapolating too much, I also think that this dropoff makes it unlikely that the Xenophon Team, despite optimistic polls (I suspect voters may be confused between the Senate and the House, but to be honest this is mostly speculation).
The other interesting thing about the Xenophon Team is that it has the possibility to lead to some very interesting results. While his House candidates are likely to be irrelevant outside of South Australia, his Senate support in the state, as well as strong polling, suggests that his party could be competitive in House seats.
The most positive individual seat polling for the Xenophon Team took place before the Liberal Party replaced Tony Abbott as leader with Malcolm Turnbull. Seat polling commissioned by trade unions a year ago suggested that a Xenophon Team candidate could win Education Minister Christopher Pyne’s seat. However, more recent polling has been somewhat less optimistic.
What will be interesting is that we will get a better picture of how preferential voting works in a multi-party environment. The importance of finishing order will be substantial, and there could be opportunities for tactical voting.
In most of the seats the Xenophon Team is targeting, the Liberal Party will almost certainly finish first in the primary vote. It is who finishes second that will be important. If, after all the other candidates are excluded, Labor is second, then the Liberals will have a good chance of victory. While the Xenophon Team is still undecided about how it will distribute their preferences, one key candidate has said that they will not file a specific how-to-vote card, and it seems likely that voters for the Xenophon Team will be more centrist.
If the Xenophon Team is second, however, then all bets are off. Labor has not yet announced its preference decisions in South Australia; however, I think it likely that they would not be too unhappy to see the defeat of a prominent Liberal MP.
Tactically speaking, it would be sensible for Labor to run a minor campaign in those seats, to ensure that the Xenophon Team finishes second on primary votes. On the other hand, the Liberals might want to surreptitiously encourage people to vote Labor (although such a campaign has not, to the best of my knowledge, been tried in Australia before).
How preferential voting works in a three-way race will become more relevant if Canada adopts it, as part of the Liberal electoral reform process. The results in South Australia, and the campaigns in the districts, might give a clue as to whether it works effectively in a multi-party environment.
Sydney has been known as the Emerald City since David Williamson’s play was first performed in 1987. Politics in Sydney are quite different from what happens ‘out in the sticks’ in the rest of the state.
New South Wales is the largest state by population and by GDP, the second by per capita income, and the third largest by area. (Both territories have higher per capita incomes) The only sister state relationship in the US is with California. Americans could think of the place as New Yorkifornia with Sydney playing many of the roles that New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco play in the US.
Apart from 1961, no-one has ever won a federal election without winning a majority of seats in NSW. The state elects 47 of the 150 MHRs and 12 of the 76 senators. Population shifts over the last few decades have tended to transfer 1 seat to either Queensland or Western Australia at each re-apportionment. The state has provided 6 of the last 10 prime ministers. ABC Vote Compass has thoughtfully posted a list of the most left-leaning and right-wing electorates in the country. NSW has 3 of the most left-leaning and none of the most right-leaning seats.
In the 1920s NSW briefly adopted STVPR. This led to a hung parliament where the Industrial Socialist Labor Party (an organisation close to the International Workers of the World) elected a single MLA who held the balance of power. STVPR was abolished in 1926, in reaction to the horror of a Wobbly balance of power.
Australia will elect all members of the house of representatives and the senate on 2 July. This is an extended campaign by Australian standards. The timing was dictated by a series of interlocking provisions in the constitution relating to double dissolutions.
Australia has a general election on 2 July for all seats in the house of representatives and the senate. The constitutional reasons for this double dissolution are canvassed in the advice tendered to and accepted by the governor-general which has been published. Sidebar: you often read British and Canadian authors who argue that conversations and advice between head of government and head of state must be private but Australian governors have been publishing ministerial advice and their response on major issues since 1975. I am not usually an enthusiast for Sir John Kerr, but in this at least he established a good precedent.
The headline view is that Labor appears to be gaining, but it is by no means clear that they will gain enough seats for a majority government. It is equally unclear who would be best placed to form a minority government in the event of a deliberative, balanced or ‘hung’ parliament. The prime minister’s personal standings have been tanking for some time but that appears to have levelled off. The opposition leader’s standings have been rising significantly. Newspoll, widely regarded as definitive, has a snapshot of how they see the situation here. Historically pollsters have relied on second preferences from the previous election to estimate preference flows because that tends to give a more accurate result than asking poll respondents.
Here is the Gazetted enrolment (30 April 2016) published by the AEC.
NSW 107 323
VIC 105 929
QLD 101 302
WA 97 228
SA 106 398
TAS 74 009
ACT 139 025
NT 65 444
The dramatic gap between the ACT and NT is a rounding error, the NT is just over 1.5 of the uniform quota and the ACT is just under 2.5. The low figure for Tasmania is a consequence of their minimum representation of 5 in the house. In my view a variation from 139 025 to 65 444 is not really acceptable in the 21st century.
The election will probably be decided in New South Wales and Queensland. Labor did quite well in Victoria in 2013, against the national trend, and has probably peaked at 19 out of 37 seats. The nest result for Labor in the snaller states and the territories would be gains of 1 seat each in South Australia, Tasmania and perhaps the Northern Territory. Western Australia is showing a marked swing to Labor and as many as 4 seats could change hands, Labor would be looking at a net gain of 6 outside NSW and Queensland. The Newspoll page has a convenient calculator that lets you estimate seat gains for particular swings.
That takes us to the battleground states with 47 seats in New South Wales and 30 in Queensland.
The magic number to form a majority government is 76. From the Australian Financial Review:
If Labor wins the July 2 election it will become the first opposition in 85 years to regain government after just one term. To do so, it needs to win a net minimum of 19 seats.
The Coalition, to avoid becoming the first government to lose power after one term since the Scullin Labor government lost in 1931, needs to lose fewer than 15 seats.
The situation is complicated by minor party and independents who may (again) be called on to decide who forms the government. I plan to do separate posts for the situations in New South Wales, Queensland and the minor parties and independents. My guess is that there will be a minority government but it is too early to say who will form government.
Labor is making loud noises about never again making a confidence and supply agreement with the Greens. Both major parties seem to think the solution to a deliberative parliament is to call a second election.
They made similar noises in Tasmania in 2010 and were rebuffed by the governor. It is hard to imagine the governor-general granting a second election for the exact some reasons that the governor of Tasmania refused to grant one in 2010.
There is a second exception to political instability in the South Pacific, which I thought should be mentioned.
The Autonomous Region of Bougainville, population approximately a quarter of a million, is a federacy of PNG. An independence referendum is due before 2020. Bougainville has its own executive, legislature and courts. The region went through an extended and bitter conflict with the national government over mining and land ownership issues between 1990 and 2005. Autonomy emerged from a peace agreement brokered by New Zealand and the Pacific Islands Forum. The history is tragic:
Bougainville has remained peaceful for a dozen years. Peace was negotiated following a decade-long war that is estimated to have caused approximately 2,000 deaths and possibly ten times as many more due to lack of services (Braithwaite et al. 2010).
The then province of Papua New Guinea fell from its top rank to the bottom in terms of per capita income and other social indicators of development among the 19 provinces.
The autonomous region has much broader powers than PNG provinces. The national government retains a defined list of powers and Bougainville anything not on that list is a function of the autonomous region. The regional constitution emerged from an inclusive process assisted by international mediators and experts. It is very different from the PNG constitution and other Pacific constitutions.
The president is popularly elected and automatically has a seat in the house of representatives.
The members of the executive council must be members of the Bougainville house of representatives. Some members of the executive council are regional representatives. Each is appointed in consultation with the members of the house of representatives for a subregion within the autonomous region. There is a similar provision a woman appointed in consultation with the women members of the house. Any member of the council can be dismissed by the president.
The president and all members of the house of representatives can be recalled. The vice-president is appointed and dismissed by the president.
While the constitution does state that the executive council is responsible to the house of representatives and through the house to the people, (Section 85(2)(a)) there is no provision for a vote of no confidence.
The removal provision reads:
94. VACATION OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), the President ceases to hold office on the assumption of office by a new President following an election of President under Section 89 (election of President) or Section 90 (special election of President).
(2) The office of President becomes vacant if the President –
(a) dies; or
(b) resigns by written notice to the Speaker; or
(c) ceases in accordance with Section 91(2) (qualifications for and disqualifications from election as President) to be qualified to stand for election as President; or
(d) is dismissed from office as President under the provisions of Part 13 (Leadership Code); or
(e) is recalled in accordance with Section 58 (recall of members of the House of Representatives); or
(f) is or becomes of unsound mind within the meaning of any law relating to the person and property of persons of unsound mind; or
(g) has been declared bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction and remains bankrupt.
Part 13 provides for misconduct in office to be prosecuted before the Bougainville high court by the Bougainville ombudsman or the independent public prosecutor. No president has been removed or recalled.
Since the peace agreement Bougainville has regained about 40% of the per capita income it had when the war broke out. The region has considerable mineral resources, including the largest copper deposit on the planet.
Should the independence referendum pass, Bougainville will be the first nation with an incontestably presidential system in Oceania, although Madison’s eyebrows could possibly reach orbit were he confronted with an executive president and cabinet who also sit in the legislature.
This post was inspired by JD’s comment on a recent post, which said that “There is an executive type (which to my knowledge has only ever existed in Israel, from 1996 to 2002), which allows the assembly to remove both the *elected* chief executive and his cabinet, by majority vote, which automatically triggers an election – elected prime-ministerial.” However, this is not the case. There is one country that not only uses this form of government, and has done so since independence: the small Pacific island of Kiribati.
Under the Kiribati Constitution, the office of Beretiteni (President) is directly elected, using first-past-the-post. The President appoints ministers from the unicameral legislature (elected using the two-round system), which does not require parliamentary approval. Not unusually for the Pacific Islands, the Attorney-General has a specifically defined role in the Constitution, and I believe holds a legislative seat automatically because of his office.
However, section 2 of article 33 states
(2) The Beretitenti shall cease to be Beretitenti-
(a) if he resigns his office, by notice in writing addressed to the Speaker;
(b) if a motion of no confidence in the Beretitenti or the Government is supported in the Maneaba ni Maungatabu by the votes of a majority of all the members of the Maneaba;
(c) if, in respect of any matter before the Maneaba, the Beretitenti notifies the Speaker that a vote on that matter raises an issue of confidence, and in a subsequent vote on that matter it is rejected by a majority of all the members of the Maneaba;
(d) if he ceases to be a member of the Maneaba otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the Maneaba
If, under the provisions of 2a, the Beretiteni is removed from office, the Council of State (a body consisting of the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Speaker of the legislature, and the Chief Justice) takes office.
This is where article 78 kicks in.
78. (1) The Maneaba ni Maungatabu (legislature) shall stand dissolved-
(a) if a motion of no confidence in the Beretitenti or the Government is supported in the Maneaba by the votes of a majority of all the members of the Maneaba; or
(b) if, in respect of any matter before the Maneaba, the Beretitenti notifies the Speaker that a vote on that matter raises an issue of confidence, and in a subsequent vote on that matter it is rejected by a majority of all the members of the Maneaba.
As I read it, this would rule out a change in government as a result of a no-confidence vote, as such a vote would automatically dissolve the legislature.
Following a general election, a ballot for Beretiteni is automatically scheduled. The Constitution stipulates that
The Maneaba (legislature) shall after the election of the Speaker nominate, from among members of the Maneaba, not less than 3 nor more than 4 candidates for election as Beretitenti, and no other person may be a candidate
Ordinary legislation is used to govern this election. As far as I can tell, the Borda count was used up to 2002, with voters being allowed to number only four candidates. However, in 2002, the legislation was amended (due to Borda being “complicated” and easy to manipulate) to have a rather unusual variant of the two-round system. In the first round, the two candidates with the most votes are declared nominated for the Presidency, while in the second round all other candidates are voted on; the top two of these are also declared nominated.
Kiribati is unusually stable for a Pacific Island country. Since independence in 1979, there have been only five Beretitenis (excluding leaders of the Council of State who took an interim role in government) compared to eleven Prime Ministers of Vanuatu since 1980 and eight Prime Ministers of Fiji since 1983.
It also has a party system, though it is fairly weak. The Elections Ordinance makes no mention of political parties (except in a section prohibiting advertising from parties in a perimeter around the polling station); however, election results suggest that a substantial number of MPs are affiliated with political parties, as are Presidential candidates. What is confusing about the parties is that the literature I have read suggests that they nominated multiple candidates for the Presidency, which seems like very odd behaviour for a political party.
The first President to lose the confidence of the legislature was Ieremia Tabai. He was re-elected as President in 1982, but without a legislative majority aligned to him. By making a minor bill a matter of confidence, he was able to dissolve the legislature, with opposition MPs apparently going along unsure of the consequences. The result was Tabai’s re-election, and a much more compliant legislature.
Tabai’s successors, Teato Teannaki, was removed by a vote of no-confidence, and did not run in the 1994 election. His successor, Teburoto Tito, lasted longer, winning three elections, but a poor result by his party in the legislative elections of 2002 meant that his narrow 2003 victory was swiftly followed by a no-confidence vote. In the elections held later in 2003, the Pillars of Truth party won 16 out of 41 seats, to 14 for the Protect the Maneaba. The remaining seats were won by candidates not affiliated to one of the parties. The following Presidential elections saw Pillars of Truth candidate Anote Tong win, narrowly.
Tong was elected two more times, serving his full term both times. His Pillars of Truth party was the largest party in both elections, though without a majority. However, the fairly fluid party system meant that he was able to avoid no-confidence votes.
At the last election, Tong was term-limited (only three terms are allowed), and he was replaced by Taneti Maamau. He is a member of the Tobwaan Kiribati Party. I am not sure how the legislative seats were distributed; the Inter-Parliamentary Union site gives this group 19 seats to 26 for Pillars of Truth; however, this figure looks like it redistributed independents to the two parties. Either way, the figure suggests that Maamau does not have especially strong support in the legislature.
So, where does this odd constitutional arrangement come from? Well, in preparation for independence, the colonial governor of Kiribati arranged a Constitutional Convention, comprised of 165 members from different parts of the county which he appointed, in order to design a more appropriate constitution. While this was met with protest within certain circles of the British colonial administration, most of the decisions of the convention were adapted in the constitution.
The goal of having an elected President appears to have been to create a figure above parochial local politics, a worthy aim, especially in the Pacific. No-confidence votes leading to elections also might give MPs pause for thought, and lead them to consider negotiation before toppling the President. While I am unsure to what extent Kiribati’s constitutional model has led to its relative stability, it is certainly worth a look for other Pacific states.
Note: Information for this post was sourced from the second volume of Nohlen’s Elections in Asia and the Pacific as well as Atoll Politics: The Republic of Kiribati edited by Howard Van Trease and Politics in Kiribati edited by Taomati Iuta.