El Salvador presidency 2019–a president from a different party?

El Salvador holds the first round of its presidential election today. If no candidate obtains more than half the votes, a runoff between the top two will be held on 10 March. El Salvador holds nonconcurrent elections (usually), with the presidency elected for five years and legislative assembly for three. The expected winner of the presidency comes from one of the smaller parties, the optimistically named Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA). Given that there will not be a new assembly election till 2021, the new president may have some difficulties governing. While no president has had his party in a majority in the assembly since the 1980s (before the settlement of the civil war), all presidents since the mid-1990s have come from either the National Republican Alliance (ARENA) or the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN). Thus El Salvador may be entering a new political era.

It might be misleading to call the expected winner an “outsider”, as Reuters did. Not only is Nayib Bukele the candidate of one of the existing (smaller) parties, but also he is the mayor of San Salvador, which would be considered the second most powerful and visible elected post in the country. He was originally elected mayor as the FMLN candidate, but was expelled from the party. He joined GANA to bolster his presidential ambitions. So some degree of “outsiderness”, perhaps, but it is not as if he’s not held important office before or is running on his own campaign vehicle apart from the party system. (The Wikipedia article says he tried to register a new party but was barred from doing so.)

So what about GANA, the likely next president’s adopted party? The most recent assembly election was in 2018, and GANA won only 10 of the 84 seats, although its 11.5% of the vote was its highest to date. GANA resulted from a split from the ARENA, which occurred after the FMLN won the presidency for the first time in 2009. It remains an essentially right-wing party, and I wish I knew more about the policymaking process under two FMLN presidencies to know what sorts of policy compromises the formerly radical-guerrilla left and a right-wing splinter made. Whatever their alliance might look like in substantive terms, it was strong enough politically that GANA did not even put up a presidential candidate in 2014.

In the 2018 election, the parties of the ruling alliance (FMLN and GANA) lost seats, as is entirely predictable from a late-term election. Thus President Salvador Sánchez Cerén has spent the past year of his term in quite a lame-duck situation, with his own party having only 21.4% of the seats and the erstwhile ally with another 11.9%. I say “erstwhile” because, while I do no know what, if any, legislative alliances the president has been working with in the last year, it is evident that GANA and the FMLN have split up their alliance: the latter party has its own candidate in today’s presidential election. (There are four candidates, including one for an alliance of ARENA and the Christian Democrats and the really old ruling party, PCN.)

A problem with an electoral cycle like the one El Salvador uses is that it allows some presidents a honeymoon election, while others do not get an assembly election till near or after the middle of their term. As we know, honeymoon elections tend to give a large boost to the party or alliance supporting a just-elected president (see France 2017 for an absolutely classic case study). Bukele will have to figure out how to govern with an assembly in which his own party has only 10 of 84 seats until the next assembly election, in 2021. And that date is 40% into his term, meaning the normal working of electoral cycles will not likely benefit him much.

I have been fascinated by El Salvador’s unusual electoral cycle for a long time, and it just keeps on delivering. However, were they to ask, I’d tell them to amend their constitution and make elections concurrent.

One thing is for sure, the Salvadoran party system, which I have long characterized as rigid, is no more–a fact already foreshadowed by the 2018 assembly result, as I noted at the time.

Costa Rica runoff, 2018: Alvarado (the better one) wins

In Costa Rica’s runoff, Carlos Alvarado beat Fabricio Alvarado. That is a relief. Fabricio ran his campaign mostly around stifling gay rights, and polling had the race very close. In fact, most polls had FA ahead (see the poll summaries at Wikipedia). However, at 60.6% to 39.3% for CA, it was not close at all.

This runoff followed an extraordinarily fragmented first round, in which four candidates had votes between 15% and 25%. FA led the first round, with 24.99% to CA’s 21.63%. The candidates of the two older parties (PLN and Social Christian Unity) came in third and fourth.

Costa Rica’s rules since the current regime was founded in 1949 have required a runoff among the top two candidates if the leader did not clear 40% of the vote in the first round. Because of the country’s historic two-party system (with some additional trailing parties), a runoff was never required until 2002. The party system has changed dramatically in recent cycles. A runoff was narrowly averted in 2006 (winner with 40.9%), and was next required in 2014 (leader with 30.6%, and runner-up with 29.7%, although the runoff contender, from the PLN, quit the race), and now in 2018.

Carlos Alvarado was nominated by the party of the incumbent president (Luís Guillermo Solís), the Citizens’ Action Party. This party has established itself as a major party in that it has passed the test of electing not one, but now two, different presidential nominees. Moreover, it has finished ahead of both of the old parties in two consecutive first rounds and ahead of at least one of them in four straight elections.

The runner-up candidate’s party, on the other hand, is a newer one. The National Restoration Party was contesting only its second presidential election (though it won congressional seats in 2006), and in 2014 its candidate managed under 1.4% of the vote.

The now more fragmented political scene raises the obvious question of how President-elect Carlos Alvarado will be able to govern. The Costa Rican presidency is one of the weaker ones among pure presidential democracies, and as the congress was elected concurrently with the first round, reflects that round’s fragmentation.

The president-elect’s party, Citizens’ Action, has only the third highest seat total in the Legislative Assembly. It won 16.3% of votes and 10 of the 57 seats (17.5%). The leading party will be the old PLN, which won 19.5% of the votes (compared to 18.6% for its presidential candidate) and 17 seats (29.9%). The National Restoration Party finished second (as it did in the presidential first round) with just over 18% of the votes and 14 of the 57 seats (24.6%).  The Social Christian Unity Party won 14.6% and 9 seats. No other party has more than 4 seats, and the total number of parties represented is seven.

Notably, even if he strikes a deal with the PLN, the president will not have quite enough to control the assembly: such a coalition would be two seats short.

The Libertarian Movement–one of the few relatively well established parties anywhere of this family–slipped well back. It will be without seats for the first time since before 1998. (The party won 9 seats in 2010, when its presidential candidate finished third with 20.8% of the vote.)

The election results will pose a governing challenge, but at least the requirement for a second round has led to the better Alvarado being elected.

The Salvadoran result 2018: The electoral cycle counts!

[Note: the following has been revised based on updated voting results– 9 March, 17:17 PM PST]

Before the assembly election in El Salvador, I suggested that the FMLN should be expected to win 24.2% of the vote. I hedged, saying I thought the Salvadoran party system probably was still too rigid to allow one of its two leading parties to fall off that far. I should not have hedged, because the preliminary results show that the largest party will be the opposition ARENA, which won 42.3%. The FMLN got 24.4%. How about that. I was off by a tenth of a percentage point in my pre-election prediction!

Well, as nice as that would be as a story, it is more complicated than that…

I now realize that I made an error in calculating my expectation of 24.2%. I based the expectation on the fact that the FMLN is the party of the incumbent president, that this election was being held with 80% of the president’s inter-electoral time lapsed, and the president’s own (first-round) vote total (in 2013). It was in the latter factor that I made a mistake, using 39.0%; that was the ARENA total, but the FMLN candidate, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, had 48.9%. Plugging that into the formula (shown below), I should have “expected” the FMLN to get 30.3% of the vote in this past Sunday’s assembly election. So the party actually did a good deal worse than the corrected expectation. And I did worse in my prediction.

Perhaps the party system is no longer so rigid; one of the leading parties can fall below a quarter of the votes after all. Alternatively, as I shall explore here, perhaps I made a second countervailing mistake, which was not to include a coalition partner. If we add the votes of GANA, a center-right party but one that has supported FMLN presidencies since 2010 and, importantly, did not compete against Sánchez Cerén in the presidential contest, we get 35.9%. That’s greater than my (corrected) expectation of 30.3%, but somewhat closer to it than the FMLN’s own vote. I will return to this issue of party vs. alliance later.

The FMLN’s 24.4% is its worst showing in the votes for assembly since its debut election in 1994 (21.4%); that election was concurrent with the presidential election and the party ran just behind its presidential candidate (24.9%) who was a very distant second. Since then, the party has won 33.0%, 35.2%, 34.0%, 39.7%, 42.6%, 36.8%, 37.2%, and now 24.4%.

The party’s high-water mark was 2009, the “counter-honeymoon” election that presaged the leftist, ex-guerrila, party’s first presidential win a few months later.* Then, holding the presidency, it slipped in 2012, an election held with about 60% of the president’s term elapsed. In 2014, it won the presidency again, then held its own in the 2015 election, held with 20% of the new president’s term elapsed.

GANA first appeared, as a split from ARENA, in 2010, just under a year after the election of the first FMLN president. It has now run in three assembly elections staring with 2012, and its votes have been 9.6%, 9.2%, and 11.5%. Interestingly, it gained in 2018 even while the FMLN lost badly. If we add the two parties’ votes together for the last three elections, we get 46.4% (not much less than Sánchez Cerén’s own percentage in 2014), 46.4% (yes, again) in 2015, and 35.9%. That is obviously a sharp decline in the two parties’ combined votes, even if one of the partners did experience an increase. FMLN and GANA will now will have a third of the assembly seats, whereas they held half the seats after both the 2012 and 2015 elections.

What led to the sharp decline this time? Many political factors, no doubt. But what really counts is the elapsed time–an election this late in a presidential term tends to be bad for the presidential party–or alliance. The FMLN in 2018 is just the latest example of an effect I first researched in my dissertation (1988) and published about in the APSR in 1995.

Now, via Votes from Seats, we have a formula:

Rp=1.20–0.725E,

where Rp is the “presidential vote ratio”– vote share of the president’s party in the assembly election, divided by the president’s own vote share (in the first round, if two-round system)–and E is the elapsed time (the number of months into the presidential inter-electoral period in which the assembly election takes place).

The key question around which this post is based is whether we should mean “party” literally as the party of which the president is nominee, or if we should include supporting parties that do not compete against the candidate. If you think it is cheating to use the alliance, I am being transparent and reporting the party totals. If you think it is OK to use the alliance when the two parties in question do not compete against each for presidency and cooperate in the assembly–despite running separately–we can compute the totals that way, too.

The formula above expects Rp=0.620 because E=0.80 for this election. Using only the FMLN assembly vote only, observed Rp=0.244/0.489=0.499. Using the FMLN+GANA vote, observed Rp=0.359/0.489=0.734. With the expected Rp=0.620, we get the previously mentioned expectation of 0.303 for the president’s alliance vote share. Obviously the president’s own vote does not change with these calculations, because any GANA-aligned voters who voted for the FMLN candidate are already included. This is why I think it makes sense to use the combined votes–not only because it makes the formula “work” better. (Honest! But F&V readers get to do peer review here!)**

This is the second nonconcurrent assembly election I have watched closely since Rein Taagepera and I developed the formula for our book (published in October, 2017). The other was in France. In April, 2017, I “predicted” that the brand new party of Emmanuel Macron would win around 29% of the vote. This was the day after the first round, and assuming he would win the second round (which he did, easily). At the time, much media commentary was of a hand-wringing character: Macron would be weak, maybe even face cohabitation, because he didn’t have any party to speak of. I said no, the electoral cycle will ensure he gets a good boost in votes in the assembly election. An elapsed time (E) of 0.017, an extreme “honeymoon” election, would almost guarantee it.

In fact, the election resulted in Macron’s party winning 32% of the vote. (And, a large majority of seats, due to the disproportional electoral system.)

So, that’s two elections in the past year called (more or less) correctly, within a few percentage points, based only on the elapsed time and the president’s own initial vote share.

I still hesitate to call this a prediction, because the parameters in the formula (1.20 and 0.725, above) are not themselves based on deductive logic. And perhaps I also should hesitate because of the ambiguity over party vs. alliance, as discussed in this post. But there just may be something to these electoral cycle effects, after all.

[Note: lightly edited since posting.]

______ Notes
* The 2009 presidential election featured only two candidates. So the party’s presidential vote was inflated due to the abstention of all but the two big parties from the presidential race that year. This is the only time smaller parties have not contested the first round. As I said at the time, the decision by the then-ARENA majority to shift from a concurrent to counter-honeymoon assembly election that year converted the assembly election into a “de-facto first round of the presidential election”. The right got spooked, perhaps, by the strong showing of the FMLN, and did not want to risk a division, even in the two-round election. The left followed suit and, with a sole candidate, narrowly won.


** In the 2015 election, based on the new president’s 48.9% of the (first round) vote in 2014 and elapsed time, E=0.20, we would have expected a votes ratio Rp=1.055. That would mean an assembly vote percentage of 51.6%. The FMLN itself won only 37.2%, but if we include GANA, as noted, we get 46.4% (Rp=0.949), which is a small under-performance. (Consequential, of course, as they failed to get the majority predicted.) How about one election farther back in the cycle? In 2012, GANA existed, but that party had not existed at the time the then-incumbent president of the FMLN was elected. So we certainly can’t include it in the calculation for 2012! For that election E=0.60, and so expected Rp=0.765. The president had won 51.3%, so we’d expect the FMLN to have won 39.2%. It actually won 36.8% (observed Rp=0.719), so it did only a little worse than the formula suggests it could have expected.

 

El Salvador ballots

Thanks to the really wonderful Twitter feed of La Prensa Grafica, following are some photos of voted ballots from El Salvador’s assembly elections of 4 March.

The ballot format is “free list” under which it is a party-list proportional-representation system, but unlike other types of list, the voter can give preference votes to candidates nominated on different lists (a feature sometimes known as panachage).

Here is one that is marked for candidates in several different lists, but none in the government-supporting parties, FMLN (red) and GANA (orange).

Here is one that marked all of the candidates in the ARENA party.

That’s a lot of work! A voter who wants to vote a straight ticket can simply put an X over the party symbol at the top, and it counts the same as a vote for each candidate on the list.

Now here is one whose vote will count for no one, but the voter had fun making statements.

Under the free-list system, a party’s votes is the sum of all the preference votes its candidates receive (including the label votes counted as one for each candidate on the list). Any preference vote thus contributes to the list’s pooled vote total for purposes of calculating seats per list. If a voter does not cast all M votes (where M is the district magnitude), that voter is sacrificing a percentage of his or her entitled voting weight.

This process also means that calculating national party vote totals is not straightforward. I am not sure what method of weighting votes across the varying-magnitude districts is used in El Salvador’s official reporting of national totals.

Salvadoran assembly election, 2018

El Salvador has its nonconcurrent assembly election on 4 March. (Also, municipal elections on the same day.) There are not very many pure presidential systems that have assembly and presidential elections nonconcurrent; this is one of many reasons why El Salvador fascinates me.

Another is the enduring relatively rigid division of the party system between the ex-guerrilla FMLN and the right-wing ARENA parties. Yet another is the free-list (panachage) system adopted in 2015. It makes for pretty big ballots!

El Salvador has presidential elections on a five-year cycle and assembly on a three-year cycle. Since the current regime was established in the early 1980s (in the midst of the civil war), elections have occurred in the same year twice. In 1994 they were concurrent. In 2009, the right-wing bloc in the assembly moved their own election up ahead of the presidential, making for a counter-honeymoon election.

In the most recent assembly election (2015), ARENA won 32 seats to the FMLN’s 31 (the assembly size is 84). In the most recent presidential election (2014), the FMLN candidate, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, won the two-candidate runoff with 50.1%. As I said, it is a closely divided party system! One factor that makes it less rigid than it once was is the emergence of GANA, which split from ARENA after the election of the first FMLN president (Mauricio Funes) in 2009. The emergence of GANA can be seen as an example of “presidentialization” of the party system, in that it was a splinter from the former presidential party to support the new president from the other side of the political divide. GANA remains broadly “conservative” but works with the FMLN in the assembly. It won 11 seats in 2015.

Polls* suggest that ARENA is in the lead. So does the electoral cycle. This election is quite late in the president’s term. The FMLN won 37.2% of the vote in 2015, somewhat down on its first-round presidential vote a year earlier (39.0%). That’s a ratio of assembly to presidential vote of 0.949. The formula presented in Votes from Seats suggests that an assembly election with 20% of the time elapsed between presidential elections would tend, on average, to feature a ratio of 1.055. (See my discussion of the formula and application to France, 2017.) So the party did only very slightly worse than we would expect, based only on a pattern documented from a wide range of elections in presidential systems. This election is at 80% elapsed time between presidential elections, which ought to produce a ratio of 0.620, or a vote of 24.2%. I suspect the Salvadoran party system is still too rigid for the FMLN to fall that far, but anything below 30% would not be a surprise, given the timing of the election. [UPDATE: I used the wrong presidential vote numbers. See comment below.]

As for the free-list electoral system, the voter may cast as many votes as the magnitude of the electoral district (which averages six, but is highly variable according to population). In much of my work, I study the process of “personal votes“; I see now that certain of my assumptions could be called into question: that candidates not only “seek” such votes but that they have consented to being candidates. There actually is an item in the Salvadoran press about a candidate who has asked to be de-listed because she did not consent to being a candidate!

Of course, another question is just how much do candidates campaign for personal votes? Another item from the Salvadoran press, from late December, showed a campaign billboard for a specific candidate.

In this case, the candidate had jumped the gun on the campaign period and was admonished by the electoral authority. So, yes, candidates (at least some) apparently do campaign for personal votes, albeit sometimes too eagerly.

Nonconcurrent elections, a post-civil-war party system, free-list PR. Plus, pupusa contests! El Salvador has a lot to hold my interest!

___

* The linked article is incorrect on the electoral system. It says that the Salvadoran electoral system has 20 nationwide seats. That was last true for the 2003 election. (The source linked to is from 2013, only a decade after such a system was last used!) There are 84 seats, 14 districts.

Honduras 2017

Honduras has presidential and congressional elections today. I know essentially  nothing about the elections except: (1) There is widespread fear they will not be fair, and (2) The congress is elected by free-list PR.

It is for the latter reason that I share the following image, which I found on Twitter, posted by Pablo Secchi.

The ballot is similar to that in neighboring El Salvador, which also uses a free list. The voter may cast up to M votes, where M is the district magnitude (number of seats elected from the district). The votes may be cast without regard for party, but each candidate vote is also a vote for the list on which the candidate was nominated. Thus it is a party-list PR system, but one in which voters are free to spread their support across multiple parties. It also means that voters are weighted differently, according to whether they cast all their votes or not.

It appears that voters can simply cast a list vote. I believe that doing so is equivalent to casting votes for as many candidates as are nominated on that list (presumably always M).

Dominican Republic has abolished its open-list system. Or has it?

[revised]

While attempting to track down records of preferential votes in Dominican Republic congressional elections, I discovered something that will be of interest to many readers of this blog:

By resolution adopted by the Junta Central Electoral in 2010 the preference vote was eliminated. It is particularly interesting in that the resolution states that the electoral law does not specify the “modality of voting” and that the adoption of open lists for the 2002 election was a prior resolution of the JCE. I wonder how many countries using PR systems do not specify in their law what the list type can be.

The resolution gives as a reason for its decision that the preferential vote has been “traumatic” for the party system. It also states that “primaries” within the parties are sufficient.

Thus in the next elections, in May 2016, the DR is supposed to revert to closed-list PR. I can’t name offhand another case that has moved from open lists to closed. Am I forgetting some other case?

However, not so fast! While the Constitutional Tribunal upheld the JCE’s ruling in 2013, congress passed a law reestablishing the preferential vote. However, the president may not have signed it, as there is another news article from 2015 that says that the preference vote is under threat, and accuses the PLD (the president’s party) of wanting closed lists in order to cope with its own internal divisions. Thus, at the moment, I don’t think we can say what the system is going to be as of May.

So far, the DR has held three elections under open lists: 2002, 2006, and 2010; before that, lists were closed. There were no congressional elections in 2014, because they are resynchronizing them with future presidential elections, starting in 2016. In other words, the congress elected in 2010 was elected for a six-year term; this is also very unusual. Not very many countries have ever had six-year terms for their sole or first chamber, although in this case it is just a one-off. Apparently they need all this time to figure out what the electoral system is going to be!

And if anyone can find for me the record of preferential votes for losing as well as winning candidates in 2002 and 2006, I will be grateful. I obtained those from 2010, and I have winners only for the other two years. The JCE’s email address for public information now has “permanent fatal errors”.

El Salvador–unusual legislative organization

On 14 May, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador passed the required measure to organize the governance of the chamber for the coming term, following the elections this past March. It is a rather unusual arrangement: The second and third largest parties will each hold the assembly presidency for half of the three-year term.

Lorena Peña of the FMLN will be assembly president for 18 months, and then on 8 November 2016, Guillermo Gallegos of GANA will assume the assembly presidency for the remainder of the term.

The opposition ARENA won 32 seats (39% of 84), against 31 (37.8%) for the FMLN and 11 (13.4%) for the GANA. The latter party has its origins in a split in the right-wing ARENA that occurred following the election of the first president from the left-wing FMLN in 2009. It has been an ally of the FMLN ever since. ARENA partner PCN won 4 seats on its own in the election, and another three seats were won by ARENA-PCN alliances in various constituencies. Therefore, the actual balance of the assembly is 42 FMLN+GANA (51.2%) to 39 ARENA+PCN (47.6%); one seat was won by the Christian Democrats (PDC).

The directing board (junta directiva) will have 4 members each from ARENA and the FMLN and 3 each from GANA and the PCN. This body, then, will have equality between the two blocs, thereby slightly over-representing the right-wing bloc. I do not know the actual powers of the presidency vs. the directing board.

I certainly do not claim exhaustive knowledge of how power is divvied up in legislative organization around the world, but the alternation of the presidency for equal time periods between two parties that are quite unequal in strength (and second and third in seat totals) must be a rare occurrence.

El Salvador joins the panachage ranks, president’s party holds steady

El Salvador held its legislative election on 1 March, using a modified electoral system. The country had already left behind the closed list in 2012, replacing it with an open list. This year the country moved to panachage, the variant of open list in which voters may vote for candidates on different lists (sometimes called “free list”).

El Salvador is one of the few pure presidential systems still using an electoral cycle (a long-term interest of mine) consisting of all non-concurrent elections, with presidential terms of five years and legislative terms of three years. This election is in the first year of the incumbent president’s term, and offered neither “surge” nor decline in his party’s legislative support.

I was first tipped off to the change to panachage by a remark in a Tico Times article just before the election that said:

For the first time, voters will be able to select individual candidates from any party rather than being forced to vote for a single party with an established list of candidates. Voters can still opt to simply choose a party.

This is definitely far more detailed than your average journalistic note about an electoral system. But to be sure, I checked with the Tribunal Supremo Electoral, which has a very useful gallery of ballot images and instruction cards. Below I post an image of the instructions for the district (department) of Cabañas.

ElSal 2015 guia

It offers the voter five options:

      1. Vote solely for the list of a party or coalition;
      2. Vote for a list and mark the photo of “one, various, or all the candidates” on that list;
      3. Mark the photo of “one, various, or all the candidates” in one list (without also indicating a list vote);
      4. “Mark candidates of distinct political parties or coalition” or candidates of distinct parties and a non-party candidate”, not exceeding the total number of deputies elected from the district.
      5. Mark the photo of a non-party candidate.**

It is option 4 that clearly establishes panachage.

By contrast, in 2012, the options excluded any mention of marking candidates across different lists.

El Salvador open list 2012

See also images of a portion of the ballot from 2015 or 2012.

For a long time the only panachage systems in use at the national level (to my knowledge) were in Luxembourg and Switzerland. In 2005, Honduras adopted such a system, and now one of its immediate neighbors has followed suit. (I believe Ecuador still uses a panchage system adopted several years ago; Venezuela used one at least once, but only at the municipal level.)

As for the election itself, there was a considerable delay in reporting the results. It does not seem that the panachage system had anything to do with the delay.

Preliminary results suggest that the opposition ARENA will have a plurality of seats, with 35 (of 84). That would represent a gain of two seats from the 2012 legislative election. The governing FMLN is likely to have 31 (no change) and its ally GANA 10 (-1). The PCN (the pre-1979 ruling party, still just hanging on) is expected to have 6 (-1) and the PDC would have 2 (a doubling of seats for this party that was the main alternative to the right before the civil war ended).

El Salvador hence essentially maintains its long-term relative stasis and close left-right division. The incumbent president, Salvador Sánchez Cerén of the FMLN, was elected by a very narrow margin a year ago. This election barely changes the balance of power, even though it occurs within the first year of a president’s five-year term and hence could qualify as a “honeymoon election”. In Salvadoran politics, there really isn’t much of a honeymoon, or any near-term prospect for the much-anticipated realignment. The big swing to the FMLN in the 2009 legislative election looks, in retrospect, like a blip within what is otherwise ongoing stasis.

It will be interesting to see if the move to an electoral system allowing cross-party voting for the first time begins to break down El Salvador’s remarkably rigid partisan lines.***

____________
* Elections could be concurrent every 15 years, as they were in 1994. However, in 2009, the legislative election was shifted to the “counter-honeymoon” and held in January, with the presidential election, as usual, in March.

** In both options 4 and 5, the reference to independents is singular; logically if voting for an independent is an alternative to voting for a party, one could vote for only one independent just as one can vote for only one party. On the other hand, in a panachage world, one actually can vote for more than  one party (assuming a vote for any candidate also counts for the party on whose list the candidate was nominated), so why would there need to be a restriction on the number of votes that a voter may give for independents? (Note that it is probably quite difficult for an independent candidate to be elected in any case.) [I edited this footnote shortly after posting.]

*** Whether the partisan lines over El Salvador can ever be broken down in the United States is another matter.

Trinidad & Tobago political reform

At the end of August, the Senate of Trinidad & Tobago (T&T) passed a package of constitutional amendments, which include some significant changes to the electoral system.

T&T has been a FPTP (M=1, plurality) system throughout its years as a democratic independent state. It has had some anomalous outcomes with FPTP, and, due to that record, in a book chapter published in 2008* I placed T&T on my “watch list” of jurisdictions in which the performance of the FPTP seemed to be setting the ground for the “inherent” conditions for a reform process to come about. Apparently T&T leaders agreed. However, the chapter was about conditions for fundamental reform to a different electoral system, such as a form of PR. The reform actually in the process of being adopted is instead non-proportional. It is still well within the “majoritarian” family. In fact, it could be seen as a move further in the majoritarian direction.

The amendments passed by the Senate call for a runoff system. The reforms have not exactly been a consensual process, with only government Senators and three independents voting for it, according to the Guardian (of T&T):

All the Opposition Senators present and six independents voted against the bill. However, the bill received the three Independents’ votes only after Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar agreed to accept an amendment to the controversial runoff clause put forward by [Independent Senator Dhanayshar] Mahabir.

The amended provision says that a majority is required for election in the first round. However, unlike the initial proposal of the government, when a runoff is needed it is not necessarily a top-two contest. Rather, the provision is that:

a third place candidate in an election, who gains 25 per cent of the votes and who is within a margin of not less than five percentage points of the second place candidate, also be allowed to contest the runoff election.

In case of a 3-candidate second round, the winner will be the candidate with a plurality. Thus we will have here a form of majority-plurality system, but with different (more “restrictive”) second-round qualifying rules than in France.

Other provisions in the original bill, and which I assume remain intact in the Senate version include (with my brief reaction):

    Term limits for the Prime Minister (unusual for a parliamentary system, although not unheard of–see South Africa and Botswana, where the term-limited “president” really is a PM).

    Right of recall against individual MPs (also unusual–unheard of?–in a parliamentary system).

    Fixed election dates (used to be unusual in British-influenced parliamentary systems, but seems to be all the rage these days).

Trinidad and Tobago is undergoing some fairly significant reforms. The bill awaits presidential assent, and despite a candlelight vigil outside the president’s residence by The Movement for Social Justice, assent is presumably a foregone conclusion.

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* “Inherent and Contingent Factors in Reform Initiation in Plurality Systems,” in the edited volume by Andre Blais, To Keep or Change First Past the Post.

A vice president is not an outsider, Panama edition

In Sunday’s election in Panama, the incumbent Vice President was elected President. The BBC headline reads, “Outsider Juan Carlos Varela wins Panama election”. But wait, he is the Vice President. That most certainly does not meet any sensible definition of an “outsider”.

Yes, as the BBC notes, Varela had become the leader of the opposition after a falling out with current President Ricardo Martinelli. Presidents and other officeholders of their parties falling out once the president has been elected is pretty ordinary in presidential democracies. So are elections of outsiders. But you really can’t get more insider than a vice president, regardless of his relation with the chief.

Oh, I could (co-)write a book about such things.

UPDATE: In a comment, I take a look at what little data I have to shed a (little) light on the matter.

Costa Rica: Araya ends campaign

The changes in the Costa Rican party system really are fundamental. Last week, Johnny Araya, the presidential candidate of the current ruling party, National Liberation (PLN), quit the runoff race. The PLN was the country’s strongest party for most of the democratic period since 1949, but Araya won just under 30% of the vote in the first round in February.

Araya’s decision means Guillermo Solis of Citizen’s Action will be elected, essentially unopposed. It also means Costa Rica will have a president who won under 31% of the vote. While Araya’s decision reflects polling that said Solis would trounce him, it raises the question of whether one of the other candidates in the highly fragmented first-round field could have mounted a stronger challenge. Maybe not, as the third place candidate, Jose Villalta, had just 17.25%.

Meanwhile, has anyone seen a breakdown of the legislative seats? Legislative elections were concurrent with the first round of the presidential election, but various sources I have consulted still do not show the result.

Salvadoran presidential runoff, 2014

Today Salvadorans vote in their runoff presidential election. FMLN candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén should win easily. For one thing, he almost won in the first round, with about 49% and a 10-point lead over runner-up Norman Quijano of ARENA. Second, polling has shown that those who voted for third-place candidate, Tony Saca, a former president from ARENA, were splitting at least evenly if not towards Sánchez Cerén. The latter might seem like a surprise–a right-wing ex-president’s supporters swinging to a former guerrilla fighter–but Saca split from his party in 2010 and led a group of ex-ARENA legislators in forming part of the legislative majority of incumbent president Mauricio Funes, also of the FMLN.

Sánchez Cerén will inherit the legislature elected in 2012 in which ARENA is the largest party (33 seats), but the FMLN (31) and Saca’s GANA (11) have a majority of the 84 seats. The next legislative election is a year away.

Costa Rica’s record fragmentation

I already said this in a comment at an earlier thread, but it is the sort of thing that is at the very core of Fruits & Votes, and hence deserves its own space…

By my calculation, the effective number of vote-winning parties in Costa Rica’s 2 Feb. election was 6.21. The effective number of presidential candidates was 4.36. Both easily break the record for the country’s elections back to 1953. The old averages and maximums were 3.21 and 4.84 for vote-winning legislative parties and 2.37 and 3.30 for presidential candidates. (Historical figures based on Bormann and Golder’s dataset.)

Costa Rica’s party system sure is unrecognizable from what it was for so long!

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The effective number of parties or candidates is by now the most well established measure of electoral or legislative fragmentation. It is simply a weighted count of the number of components (parties, candidates, or anything else) where the components are weighted by their own size through squaring them. Operationally: square each component’s share (out of 1), sum the squares, and take the reciprocal of the sum. Originally proposed by Laakso and Taagepera in a 1979 article.

Elections in Costa Rica and El Salvador

Presidential elections are taking place today in two countries in Central America, El Salvador and Costa Rica. The latter country also has legislative elections, whereas El Salvador uses a non-concurrent cycle and will not elect its National Assembly for another year.

DW says:

Experts say both of Sunday’s votes will result in runoffs, as neither candidate leading in the polls is likely to get the 50 percent plus one vote needed to declare victory.

One might wonder who these experts are, as in Costa Rica, it takes 40% to win in a single round, not a majority.

For El Salvador, an average of five recent polls puts the incumbent Vice President Salvador Sanchez of the FMLN in the lead, but indeed well short of a majority: 35.6%. The ARENA candidate, Norman Quijano, currently mayor of San Salvador, is second with an average of 31.3% in the polls. In third with around 11% is Elias Antonio Saca of GANA. Saca is a former president from ARENA who split from his party with a good chunk of its caucus in the current National Assembly to lend support to Mauricio Funes, elected in 2009 as the first president from the FMLN. Obviously, his voters will prove pivotal in the upcoming presidential race just as his votes have been pivotal in the legislature.

As for Costa Rica, the race is said to be tight between Johnny Araya of the ruling National Liberation Party and Jose Maria Villalta from a left-wing Broad Front that has been only a marginal force until now. In fact, other than in 2002, Costa Rica has never required a runoff, as it has had two parties generally dominant since the current democratic regime was founded in the late 1940s. However, in recent years it has been more fragmented. (In 2006 the winner barely averted a runoff, and both leading candidates were just barely over 40%.) Perhaps runoffs are going to be needed more frequently in the future.