Probably MMP, but with seats won by independents (i.e. candidates without an affiliated party list) removed from the calculations of how many compensatory seats from the list each party obtains.
With municipal elections in South Africa set for 18 May, Terry Tselane, commissioner of the Independent Electoral Commission, is appealing to parties to make sure they each submit only one list.
An excerpt, from The New Age:
“We know that political parties have issues of tension about who is actually a leader of that political party. It will have implications in terms of how we run our processes. It is on that basis that we are saying that political parties must submit the list of those people that will be authorised. We are trying to avoid a situation where in the morning you receive a list from political parties from one specific leadership and later on another one comes and says the person who submitted the list is not authorised,” he added.
Asked how they would resolve a situation like that in Cope, where there were two factions each claiming to be in charge Tselane responded: “We are operating on the basis of information submitted to us before the (2009) elections. Until such time that there are changes we will continue to operate on the basis of information they submitted to us.”
It is a classic closed-list ballot: no candidates’ names included.* Just the photo of the no. 1 candidate–the one who will become “President” if the party wins the majority or leads a coalition.
In a separate post, Steven discusses the patterns of national and provincial lists.
Regarding the no. 1 candidate on each national list: he or she is technically the party’s “presidential candidate.” Yet another of those subtleties usually missing from the media coverage is that the successful candidate, while having the title of President, is really a prime minister: the election is not direct (because becoming President depends on the outcome of the parliamentary election), and the occupant of the post is subject to removal by a majority in a no-confidence vote.
Of course, one party is going to get an overwhelming majority once again, and the leadership will have chosen the individual legislators–due to the closed list.
It is also worth noting that the President/prime minister is also head of state, which is rather unusual for a parliamentary system. The occupant of the office is also limited in tenure, which is also unusual. So the roles of head of government and state are fused, but South Africa is without qualification a parliamentary system.
* Elsewhere, some closed-list ballots do list some (or, if the district is small, all) of the candidates and not just the leader. But given that such ballots allow no candidate voting, there is no “mechanical” need to show candidates. That’s what I mean by “classic” closed list: just the parties (and their candidate for national executive). (I suppose one could say it would even more classic if even the no. 1 candidate were not shown. I am not aware of such a ballot, but perhaps one has existed somewhere.)
Continuing this week’s theme of educating reporters, I would note that the lack of comparative politics understanding in the news media is not just an American affliction. On Deutsche Welle’s (English-language) Journal TV program this morning, a report on the South African election indicated that the main question was whether the ANC would retain the two thirds majority it needs “to make laws.”
Now I do not deny that some constitutions require two-thirds majorities to make certain laws (and sometimes not only constitutional amendments). And the ANC may well have an agenda for the coming term that would require super-majorities to accomplish. However, one might have gotten the impression from the report that all laws require two thirds to pass in South Africa. One would be mistaken in that impression; like most democratic legislatures, most decisions are taken by (simple) majority (see Article 53).
I offer up this space for discussion of South Africa’s general elections on 22 April.
The main question of interest is how strong a performance we will see from the Congress of the People (COPE), which split from the currently hegemonic African National Congress (ANC). Could the ANC fall below a majority? If it did, that would be some fall, given that it won almost 70% of votes and seats in 2004.
Nelson Mandela made a “surprise” appearance at the ANC’s final election rally. That presumably can’t hurt.
I have been wanting to address this issue, but have lacked time. Fortunately, Alan came to my rescue. Here, moved from a previous comment thread, is some information from Alan. (Thanks for planting, Alan!)
South Africa may be about to experience its first presidential removal. The relevant provision of the constitution is:
102. Motions of no confidence
If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.
If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign.
[Alan again.] If the motion is successful the speaker acts as president until the assembly elects a new president. A new election only happens if the assembly does not complete an election within 30 days.
[MSS again] My subject line deliberately points to the unusual case of South Africa’s institutions: the country’s constitution is clearly parliamentary (fused origin–i.e. there are no separate executive elections–and fused survival in the sense of executive dependence on parliamentary confidence). Yet, rather unusually for a parliamentary system, the head of the parliamentary majority is also the head of state. Thus he really is both a prime minister and president, and his title is the latter. He is also subject to term limits.
To make things even more unusual, from a parliamentary standpoint, the ruling ANC replaced its leader a while ago (from Mbeki to Zuma), yet the PM/president was not changed. This sort of ‘dyarchy’ is not unheard of, but is rare in parliamentary systems. (Various aspects of this developing dyarchy have been covered in past plantings: just click on the country name in the “Planted in” line and they will come up on the same page.)
From Business Day (Johannesburg), via All Africa, comes a report on the African National Congress leadership in the province of KwaZulu-Natal beginning to prepare its (closed) party lists for the 20009 general election:
At the best of times, compiling candidate lists for seats in Parliament poses major challenges as the party tries to derive maximum benefit in the deployment of its cadres. It is a complicated process, requiring a deep understanding of the nature of an organisation that draws support from such diverse interest groups.
The lists have to mirror, as much as possible, the core constituency of the ANC while at the same time ensuring that particular skills and talents are retained. As the party grows in rural areas, eroding steadily what was once the Inkatha Freedom Party’s (IFP’s) key support base, it has to reflect that in the line-up for the election.
The party also benefited spectacularly from the now out-of-favour floor-crossing legislation. Common decency would require that those who brought with them seats from other parties should at least be placed favourably on the list to ensure they go back to Parliament.
Then, of course, there is the drive to attain a 50% representation of women, which should mean more than a handful of men will be looking for other jobs next year.
Traditionally, the list process has to ensure that there is decent representation of the interests of the alliance partners — a particularly important component if we remember the support given to Jacob Zuma ahead of the last elective ANC conference.
It is indeed also time to reward those who worked tirelessly for Zuma’s win. Payback time, if ever there was one. The question is whether the ANC will be prepared to sacrifice the experience and talent of the comrades who were anti-Zuma. […]
The article also notes that the ANC’s task is especially critical in KwaZulu-Natal, as in that province the IFP and the ANC are likely to be in “a fierce contest.” In other words, to the extent that voters pay attention to the candidates on (or at least near the top of) the lists, candidate quality may sway some votes between the parties. Moreover, the uncertainty about how many seats the party will win complicates its fine intraparty balancing act, as some candidates chosen to represent one or another group or to bring one or another skill to parliament may fail to win seats, if the party performs more poorly than expected.
And then, of course, there is the wild card of the trial of Zuma, if it goes ahead.
A second article from the same source notes the changing nature of the relationship between the party and the government and the impact this is having on the party’s internal processes.
Crucially, power has seeped away from the executive as the ANC grapples with the now stark differences between the party in government and Luthuli House. The fluidity continues to express itself in all areas of our public discourse and within our institutions generally. Parliament is no different in that respect. The ANC parliamentary caucus simply reflects the political fluidity of the moment. It is for this reason that MPs suddenly find themselves with the political space for manoeuvre and the ability to question the executive openly.
…For too long now, Parliament has been tired, mostly reactive and seldom proactive in raising debate or questioning the status quo.
…What is clear and probably predictable is that the ANC within Parliament is unable to separate itself from the political turmoil within the party.
As the party list conference and next year’s elections loom, there will inevitably be tensions as party members fight to retain their positions on the party list.
It seems unlikely that the ANC will fall below a majority in parliament any time soon, but is the executive’s hegemony breaking down on the intraparty dimension? Or is this just a transitional phase, brought about by the rather odd situation (for a parliamentary system) of a party leadership change before the end of the term of the current chief executive?