The NZ Herald is a nifty interactive graph of polling trends in New Zealand that lets you go all the way back to 1999 and see how the parties’ positions in public approval have shifted.
(Thanks to David for the tip.)
In a previous thread, we have discussed the Yitsug Shalem electoral system proposed by Israeli President Moshe Katsav’s commission on governance. The proposal is a single-vote mixed-member system with a 75/25 split between the nominal-plurality and compensation tiers. (It is not a list tier, because the proposal has no party list, per se, but rather is based on “best losers.”)
For reasons already discussed in the previous thread (mainly by the propagators), the electoral-system proposal is a bad one for minority representation (despite the claims of the proposal’s principal author).
Here I want to highlight a few other aspects of the proposal that are not specifically matters of the electoral system, but rather of the broader system of governance. They amount to a logically incoherent and broderline authoritarian set of proposals.
The author of the proposal and of the Haaretz overview of it, Aharon Nathan, gives as one of the key advantages of the proposed electoral system its creation of single-member constiutency MKs, “which creates a bond between the MK and his/her constituents, increasing accountability in the process.”
Yet any alleged benefit from constituency linkage and accountability would be meaningful only if it gave the members so elected the ability to dissent from the party line if doing so was in the interest of the constituency. But such dissent is manifestly not the intent of the proposal’s authors.
In order to add to the stability of future governments, the introduction of this new electoral system needs to be accompanied by measures to strengthen the cohesion of political parties in the Knesset and the position of the prime minister.
How to do this? The proposal would force–yes, force–MKs whose parties formed a governing coalition to vote with the government or else forfeit their seats (with a by-election in the case of a constituency MK or replacement by the next-best-loser in the case of a compensatory member).
As if that were not enough, while it would take 61 of 120 votes in the Knesset to confirm a new Prime Minister, “Dismissing him/her should necessitate a majority of, say, 80 or 90 MKs.”
As if that still were not enough, the PM would have the right to appoint anyone to a cabinet position and to dismiss ministers unilaterally.
It is worth noting that the increased independence of the chief executive (stemming mainly from the supermajority requirement for a vote of no confidence) would enhance the incentive of MKs of the governing coalition to dissent from their party line (because doing so would be less likely to put the government itself at risk), and thus would be consistent with the desire for constituency accountablity of individual MKs. Yet the proposal has severe penalties for just such dissent from the party line.
This proposal would greatly enhance central executive authority, without making that executive accountable to the electorate, through popular election.
In previous discussions, I said that I noted that a presidential system would be inappopriate for Israel. This is worse.
Maybe Katsav (whose office is essentially ceremonial) was too distracted to notice his commission had become a rogue.
[UPDATE: Eduardo posts the data and a discussion of the departmental elections below. Thanks, Eduardo!]
I want to call readers’ attention to an excellent radio program on Bolivia. On Open Source, it aired on January 3, but I just now have had a chance to listen to it.
It features Jeffrey Sachs and Miguel Centellas. Sachs, of course, is an internationally renowned development economist and advisor on economic reform in Bolivia during the hyperinflationary crisis twenty years ago (as well as in post-Soviet Russia and elsewhere). Centellas is familiar to F&V readers from his many excellent comments here in various threads on Bolivia and MMP systems. Jim Schultz, of the Democracy Center and Blog from Bolivia is also on the program. Continue reading
This is a service for my students (or anyone else who might be interested, or else why would I post it here?). Students often ask me what sorts of jobs there are in applying the principles covered in my Policy-Making Processes course, in which students are trained to “read” a political system. There was a series at Slate in early 2004 that is directly related to this question–a weeklong journal about analysts at the Eurasia Group.
The author of the Slate journal has a Ph.D. But I am fairly confident (though I admit as yet I don’t have direct evidence) that well trained Masters students (such as those with MPIAs, especially in our Public Policy track [PDF]) are indeed qualified for jobs of this sort–in fact, I am convinced that we train people better for this kind of career than do most Ph.D. programs.
Bolivians vote on Sunday, and the most likely outcome remains a plurality of the vote for MAS, the party of Evo Morales. He will not win a majority, and so a joint sitting of the two chambers of congress that will be elected on Sunday will select the president. Its choices will be restricted to either Morales or the candidate who is second in votes–almost certainly former president Jorge Quiroga. Continue reading
Two recent polls in Bolivia’s December 18 legislative/presidential election have somewhat different results, though both put Evo Morales of the MAS in the lead. Continue reading
On November 15, commenting on a poll that had PRD candidate LÃ³pez Obrador (“AMLO”) at 39%, the PRI’s dinosaur Madrazo at 29%, and newly nominated PAN candidate CalderÃ³n at 25%, I said:
The real race right now is for second place […] If CalderÃ³n can pull ahead of Madrazo, I could see it developing into a two-way race between the PAN and PRD, pushing the PRI into into 25-percent territory.
Well, I never imagined it could happen so fast. Continue reading