Italy votes in general elections today. The Brothers of Italy is expected to be the largest party, in a pre-electoral alliance with the League and Forza Italia that may end up with a substantial majority of seats in both houses.
The electoral system is similar to that used in 2018 in that it is mixed-member majoritarian despite having just over 60% of seats elected in the party-list proportional component of the system. In an important sense, however, this year’s version is even more majoritarian–the size of both chambers has been reduced substantially. Other things equal–as they are–a smaller assembly is less proportional (or “permissive” to small parties). And when you combine a relatively majoritarian system with a smaller assembly, you get a more majoritarian system overall. The new Chamber of Deputies, at 400 seats, is closer to the cube root law expectation for a country the size of Italy, but nonetheless the impact would be to favor more substantially than before the largest party or pre-electoral alliance, relative to the 2018 system which had a Chamber size of 630. The size of the Senate has been reduced correspondingly from 315 to 200 seats.
How is the system mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and not mixed-member proportional (MMP)? This question has been asked before. The answer is straightforward: the seats a party wins in the list component are simply added on to those that it wins in the nominal component (single-seat districts decided by plurality). There is no compensation mechanism, not even a partial one like in the 1994–2001 version Italy used.1 There is a single vote, but whether voters can split their votes between nominal and list components has no bearing on the classification, which depends entirely on whether the list seats are allocated so as to compensate for deviations from proportionality arising from the district results (as under MMP) or not (as with “parallel” allocation under MMM).
The results from 2018, aggregated by pre-election alliances that coordinate nominations in the single-seat districts, certainly made this clear. The center-right alliance combined for 37% of the votes. This alliance won 42% of the seats, which is not terribly disproportional. However, we have to remember that more than three fifths of the seats are elected by PR. The nature of the system can be seen by looking at the detailed breakdown. The alliance won 111 nominal seats (out of 232, for 47.8%). Thus they were over-represented in this component of the system, as expected from single-seat plurality. If the list component were compensatory, as under MMP, the share of list seats won by this alliance should have been lower than its share of the vote. Yet it won 39.1% of them (111 of 386). It should have ended up with somewhere around 233 seats were these seats compensatory, but instead won 265 (including 3 seats for Italians overseas).
If we take the largest opposition force, the dynamic is even clearer. This was Five Star, which ran on its own, not as a part of any pre-electoral alliance. It won 32.7% of the vote, and 93 of the 232 nominal seats. That is 40%, so it is also slightly overrepresented in this component. To this it added 133 list seats, which is 34.5%, ending up with 227 seats total (including 1 abroad), or 36.0%. That the system was MMM becomes clearer still if we consider the second largest opposition alliance, the center-left. It had 22.9% of the vote, and won 28 nominal seats. This is only 12.1% of these seats–sever underrepresentation, as expected for a third party under single-seat plurality. Its list seat total was 88, which is 22.8% of the list component. Yes, 22.8%, so it got near-perfect proportional representation. However, it got this proportional result only in the list seats themselves. Overall, due to the punishment in the nominal seats, it was underrepresented, ending up with 122 seats (including 6 from Italians abroad), which is 19.4%. It was not severely underrepresented in the final result because–again–the list component is so large. However, were the system MMP they should have had approximately 110 list seats instead of just 88, in order to make their overall seats proportional to list votes. And, as already covered, the other alliances and parties would have had their list seats cut somewhat due to a compensation mechanism, if it were MMP. Thus the system is MMM, albeit with a large list component. I should also add that when I say “list votes” I mean votes aggregated from the nominal contests, given there is only a single fused ballot and not separate list and nominal votes (as there are in the MMM systems of Japan and Lithuania, or in the MMP systems of Germany and New Zealand).
Because polling for today’s election shows the Brothers of Italy in the lead and the combined center-right alliance clearing 40% of the vote while the second place center-left alliance looks to be under 30%, the system likely would provide a substantially larger boost to the center-right this time around than last, even if the rules were unchanged. However, assembly size is a core defining characteristic of an electoral system. If the rules for how seats are allocated are unchanged, and the balance in an MMM system between nominal and list seats is also unchanged, the key variable in how majoritarian it will be overall is assembly size. As already noted, both houses are half as large in the 2022 system as they were in 2018. This change promises a further boost to the winning alliance. There are only 147 single-seat contests in the Chamber of Deputies this time (around as many as in the Australian House of Representatives) and only 74 in the Italian Senate (about as many as in Liberia’s first chamber), it will be even more “work” for the list-PR component allocation to offset, despite its size relative to the nominal, given it is non-compensatory.
In terms of effective seat product, my estimations have it at 920 in the 2018 election. The goal behind the effective seat product is to allow us a rough approximation of what simple electoral system a given complex system is most similar to, in terms of its impact on the party system. Simple, single-tier systems with seat products in the 900–1000 ballpark include Luxembourg (900) and Greenland (961). The former has an assembly about ten percent the size of Italy’s in 2018, yet in terms of impact of the party system, the design of Italy’s system made it more like the simple PR system for the 60-seat assembly of Luxembourg than like other assemblies with 600+ seats and PR allocation (e.g., Germany’s effective seat product is currently around 1800 and Italy’s under its old PR system prior to the early 1990s was around 9800). As for Greenland, they get an effective seat product of 961 from an assembly of only 31 seats by allocating in a single territory-wide district. In other words, while Italy 2018 was a system of MMM, the large assembly and large share of seats allocated in the list component make the Chamber system of 2018 similar to a small-assembly PR system. But what about 2022?
The calculation of the effective seat product for the new Chamber of Deputies system would be around 650. In other words, roughly the same effect on a party system as Britain’s FPTP system, despite the election of over three fifths of deputies in a PR component. This is a fairly substantial reduction. It is based on the “as if” calculation of (1) an MMP system with same parameters as Italy’s new system, which would be an effective seat product of around 2860, and (2) a FPTP system of the actual size of Italy’s nominal component (147). For MMM, we take the geometric average of these two values, which is (rounded) about 650. This is very slightly less restrictive than the MMM system that was in use from 1994 to 2011 (for which the effective seat product could be said to have been around 660). Applying the same procedure to the Senate electoral system of 2022 would yield an effective seat product of around 370, implying roughly the same impact on the party system as the FPTP system of the Canadian House of Commons has.
In conclusion, Italy now has the most restrictive and thus plurality-favoring electoral system it has had in the post-WWII era.2 Despite still having a fragmented multiparty system in which parties enter pre-electoral alliances, it has an electoral system that is more like FPTP in the UK (in the case of the Chamber) or Canada (in the case of Italy’s Senate) than like a PR or MMP system. If the largest alliance clears 40% of the votes, as expected, it should obtain a substantial bonus in seats, due to the relatively majoritarian design of the system.
- That system was also MMM. It was often mis-classified in various sources as MMP. The misunderstanding was somewhat more justifiable than for the current one, because of the partial compensation mechanism, which was based on adjusting party-list votes according to nominal seat performance (rather than allocating list seats with regard to nominal seats won as is done under MMP). Even with the partial-compensation mechanism, that former system also should be classified as MMM.
- All of Italy’s post-war electoral systems have been complex in one way or another. Above I mentioned that the system in use as of the early 1990s had an effective seat product around 9800. That was a remainder-pooling PR system and Italy has not used a PR system since then. The mixed-member system put in place in 1994 had an effective seat product around 660. The bonus-adjusted system from 2006 through 2013 comes out to around 1325 (but this is a more challenging system to estimate because of its unusual features). In all cases, these numbers refer only to the Chamber. Also, the calculation of effective seat product for the 1994–2001 system does not take the partial compensation mechanism into account. Perhaps it should, which would increase the effective seat product of that former system to some (small) degree. However, it is not clear how one would carry out such an adjustment, given the unusual nature of the mechanism. I do not think it is necessary or worthwhile to attempt.
“Applying the same procedure to the Senate electoral system of 2022 would yield an effective seat product of around 370”
In the Senate, the PR tier seats are allocated to parties region-by-region, not nationwide as in the Chamber. I have no idea if your calculation of the Senate effective seat product has taken this in account.
You are correct. I have done some calculations about how to model MMM or MMP systems with regional districting of the list component. It is hard to work out, and it seems not to really matter. So, no, it does not take it into account, and I don’t think it needs to do so.
However, if the regional PR feature were taken into account it could only decrease the effective seat product.
Some information on this question–specific to the regionalized MMP of Scotland–is contained in the online appendix to chapter 15 of Votes from Seats.
Clarification: When I say “Seems not to really matter” I mean for the effective number of seat-winning parties and the seat share of the largest party–and therefore for how we think about “effective seat product.” It seems it does matter for disproportionality and the effective number and largest share based on votes. I am working on predictive formulas to take the districted list component into account when attempting to estimate these latter quantities. It is still a work in progress, but it seems promising. The intuition is that vote-wastage accumulates across all the districts and thus regional districting increases both Nv and D, but evidently has little impact on Ns.
Would I be correct in casting this electoral law as having flowed from a polarizing episode? See statement opening the second paragraph, here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_electoral_law_of_2017. I have not followed the sequence of Italian electoral “reforms” closely enough to know.
If you want to pursue the question (which is a good one), you might look up Gianluca Passarelli’s chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems. The chapter was written after the current law (but old assembly size) was in place, although before the 2018 election had occurred.
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Shifting the focus slightly from the math to the politics, Lee Drutman tweeted, “… it is striking that under the new electoral system, which rewards pre-election coalitions and thus shifts Italian politics towards two-bloc majoritarian politics, the far-right is ascendant.” Do you agree or disagree?
I think Lee is probably overstating the degree to which the blocs have been relevant to actual parliamentary politics. In the 2018-2022 parliamentary term, some members of the right-wing coalition has been in two governments: however, the entire coalition never entered either the Conte or Draghi governments. Forza Italia and Brothers of Italy were not part of the Conte government, and Brothers of Italy stayed out of the Draghi government. The far-right’s ascendance probably has more to do with this. In any case, the idea that the 2018 electoral system particularly incentivises electoral blocs is not very convincing imo. Blocs have been in some sense relevant since the electoral system change 1994, and have been particularly important since 2006.
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Each of the electoral systems since 1994 has generated incentives to form blocs, because the design of the system (as captured in the math) encourages the parties to coalesce before elections (thus shaping the politics). But indeed, the parliamentary politics has not entirely followed the electoral–somewhat unusually for systems of pre-electoral coalitions, I believe.
Also, while you should take the following with a grain of salt, because I do not claim to understand Italian politics, I think a lot of the old mainstream right has moved to the Brothers of Italy because, despite the latter’s neo-fascist origins, they were somewhat more palatable than the other current right-wing forces, the League (Salvini) and Forza Italia (Berlusconi). The Brothers are really not “far right” in precisely the same way as the German AfD or the Sweden Democrats, or Le Pen’s National Rally, for example.
Nonetheless, it is true what Lee says about the electoral system’s incentives for two blocs having aided this set of parties.
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I only mention it because it is only briefly mentioned in the post, but the fused ballot could be pretty important in understanding outcomes here, too. That fused ballot could create a weird distorting effect on voter behavior that in combination with the smaller size and lack of a compensating mechanism could lead to a more disproportional outcome.
Interestingly, in that area, one Senate and one Chamber seat (in eastern Sicily) were won by the regionalist South Calls North party, which only ran in a few electoral districts and as such had no chance of winning any seats on the list tier. This struck me as interesting for voters, given that the weight of their votes would have been considerably diminished by using their single vote on a party unable to win list seats.
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Yes, that is a good point. This is precisely the type of party that would tend to be harmed by the fused ballot. If fusion has any clear effect, it is probably towards nationalization of competition, and reduction of local/personal voting.
“South Calls North” is an interesting party name.
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I agree that it could. But when I look at the disproportionality of MMM systems (i.e., all of them that have existed in democratic contexts) I simply do not see much evidence that it matters systematically whether there is one vote or two.
It likely matters for other outcomes (like intra-party politics and the “personal vote”), but no so much for disproportionality. Whether one vote or two, MMM creates strong incentives towards pre-electoral blocs that jointly nominate district candidates but present separate party lists. Note that to the extent that they don’t compete against each other in single-seat districts, disproportionality is reduced from what it might be otherwise. And this is true regardless of the fused or separate ballots, if we measure vote shares via the lists as we normally do in such systems.
Largely agree that it doesn’t have a systemic impact. But it puts the onus for strategic coordination in the hands of the parties themselves, and if that coordination fails, voters are left with the usual mixed signals that an MMM system sends about how they should vote. So I think if the coordinating of parties fails to materialize, or is imbalanced like it was here, you can see disproportionality exacerbated by the fused ballot.
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