Voter choice or partisan interest? The case of ranked-choice voting in Maine

Galvanized by the first ever ranked-choice-voting (RCV) win in a U.S. state, reformers just hours ago held a conference call to build their movement. Ranked-choice voting is a set of voting rules more kind to “outsiders” than our ubiquitous plurality system. Given the unusual strength of America’s two-party system, why do outsider-friendly electoral reforms ever win?

My answer is: a replacement institutional template, losing-party self-interest, and ruling-party disunity. In a recently published paper, I show how this logic can explain the spread of “multi-winner ranked-choice voting” (i.e., proportional representation or PR) in the first part of the 20th century. Losing parties and disgruntled ruling-party factions promote voting-system change in a bid for policy-making influence. Voting reform organizations supply the replacement template.

Does my answer also explain the RCV win in Maine? Is that enough to buy my argument? If the answers are “yes,” reformers would concentrate on jurisdictions with sizable out-parties and fractious ruling parties.

Americanist political scientists would also change the way they think about election “reform.” The dominant trend for more than a century has been to see party and reform as exclusive. Fifty years ago, we would have read about conflict between “machine politics” and “good government.” Now we read about “activists” versus “compromisers,” legacies of Progressivism, and reformer “process-obsession.” What if party itself were a critical reform ingredient? As Jessica Trounstine reminds us in her excellent book, Democratic boss Thomas Pendergast was more than happy to turn the model city charter (without PR) to his own “machine” ends in Kansas City.

Let’s see if my template-loser-faction model explains what just happened in Maine.

The template

“Maine has not elected a governor to a first term with majority support since 1966,” said Jill Ward, President of the League of Women Voters of Maine. “Ranked Choice Voting restores majority rule and puts more power in the hands of voters.” – quoted from

Efforts to enact RCV began in 2001.

The losing party

Circumstantial evidence suggests that, from 2001 until the 2014 re-election of Gov. Paul LePage (R), the Democratic Party either:

1) controlled a policy veto point via the governorship, or

2) did not expect “independent” voters’ ballot transfers under single-winner RCV to help elect its candidates.

How is 2014 different for Democratic Party expectations? If the rhetoric of the current governor is any indication, the Maine Republican Party has become more socially conservative. Perhaps it is now so socially conservative (in Democrats’ minds) that the Democratic Party thinks “independent” voters would rank its candidates over Republicans. Maybe Democrats are thinking: “If we had RCV, we wouldn’t be the losing party.”

The disgruntled, ruling-party faction

My hunch is that this is a group of fiscal conservatives, no longer at home in either state party. That doesn’t make them a disgruntled, ruling-party faction, but it might have made them willing to consider Republicans in earlier years. Consider:

  • Proponent of record for Question 5: An Act to Establish Ranked-choice Voting. Liberal on some economic issues, but supports consumption taxes and income-tax reduction.
  • Two-time independent candidate for governor. Liberal on the environment, ambiguous on economics, but not a conventional Democrat of yore. Endorsed independent candidate Angus King (over the Democrat) to replace outgoing Sen. Olympia Snowe, a famed “moderate” Republican.
  • One-time independent candidate for governor. Quits Democratic Party to run. Wanted Maine “to be the Free Enterprise State.”

Predictions and evidence

Last month I predicted that a coalition of regular Democrats and “the independents” would put RCV over the top. Republicans threw me a curve ball by endorsing RCV the very next day, but, as the proprietor of this blog has written, such endorsements can be strategic.

If I was right, Democrats and “the independents” should have voted for RCV, but the Republicans should not have.

Below I give a rough test of these hypotheses. Here are precinct-level results of the vote in favor of RCV by the vote for each major-party presidential candidate. (Vote shares are overall, not of the two-party vote.) This is preliminary. I only have data so far for 87 percent of precincts, the state has not released official results, and I have not looked at the correlation of RCV support with partisanship in other offices. I don’t yet have a way to get at behavior by “the independents.” Finally, I have not yet run an ecological inference analysis, but I plan to remedy all this later.

As you can see, Democrats seemed to like RCV, and Republicans did not, at least as revealed by presidential voting.

The role of uncertainty

Why don’t “the independents” simply join the Democratic Party if they dislike current Republican positions as much as the Democrats? This is what’s really interesting about the adoption and use of RCV. I argue that groups in reformist alliances do not plan to cooperate on all pieces of legislation. Let’s say Maine ends up with an “independent” governor or a sizable contingent of “independents” in its state legislature. I would not be surprised if we see them working with Democrats on some legislation (e.g., “social”), then with Republicans on other bills (e.g., taxes).

Why don’t Democrats foresee this possibility? Perhaps they recognize that single-winner RCV is not the same as PR. Consequently they may reason that “independents” will not become a bargaining force. Rather, “independent” ballots will bolster the position of Democrats in government.

Then why are “independents” going along with a reform that’s good for Democrats? Perhaps they disagree with Democrats on who’s likely to benefit from strategic voting. As Gary Cox reminds us, strategic voting depends in the end on voter expectations, shaped by elite messaging about precisely which party or candidate is “hopeless” under a given electoral system. The perception that RCV has made elections kinder to outsiders is important. If there really are many sincerely “independent” voters, “independent” candidates may get a toehold in government.

And that’s when things get interesting.

12 thoughts on “Voter choice or partisan interest? The case of ranked-choice voting in Maine

  1. Fascinating stuff Jack. Have you applied this model to the San Francisco Bay Area at all? Many local and county governments have been using RCV since the early 2000s and no organized movement to repeal has yet occurred. Is it because these are non-partisan elections and/or due to the absence of the GOP as a viable party? Curious to get your thoughts.

    • Hi, Jim. I have not looked at the Bay Area implementations very closely. I’d be interested in your thoughts.

      My sense about California, especially its urban areas, is that factionalism often plays out within a hegemonic party. This was true of its Republican Party at the turn of the 20th century, and locals tell me the Democratic Party today works the same way.

      But I’m on the other coast, so you might know better.

      • I’m reading your reply again, Jim. The nonpartisan elections don’t really matter. Parties/factions find a way to exist (and often cause nonpartisanship in the first place).

        It could be that there are no (longer) any organized factions.

        It could also be that the deal-breaking faction is getting what it wants.

        That’s what my theory says. I could be wrong.

  2. Thanks for both replies. I’m actually a grad student stuck in the middle of the country, so neither of us are expert on West Coast politics. Based on your theory and my rudimentary knowledge of San Francisco politics, it would seem to be the old regular vs. independent Democrats with the Greens running around on the sidelines. I just wonder if regular/independent faction balance is whats keeping RCV around, or if some other explanation, like the generally left/alternative vibe of the Bay Area, might account for this. i.e. the left is inclined to support more “fair” voting systems making a repeal proposition more difficult to pass.

    • Maybe. I’d need to know who’s in government. If there aren’t any greens, that’s good enough to rule out repeal (on basis of what I say in the working paper).

  3. “… IRV actually neuters third parties, especially those with a strong ideological orientation. Third parties may get higher shares of first-preference votes under IRV, but it is still almost impossible for them to win seats, and they lose all the “blackmail power” that they enjoy under plurality. Currently, strategic third parties can choose to run candidates in races where they want to punish one of the major-party candidates (as Day did to Ayotte) and refrain otherwise. This possibility gives major parties an incentive to cater a bit to ideological minorities.

    Is this blackmail power a good thing or a bad thing? It depends on one’s perspective, I suppose, but one way to defend it is to note that democracy’s institution of majority rule threatens to trample the rights and interests of passionate minorities. Third-party blackmail power under plurality rule gives passionate minorities some leverage; it is a way of incorporating intensity of preference into our otherwise majoritarian political system.

    For libertarians, the Libertarian Party’s potential blackmail power is a valuable thing. We libertarians expect Democrats at least to be decent on civil liberties and Republicans at least to be decent on economic freedom. When they stray to the authoritarian side of the spectrum, the Libertarian Party can run a candidate to punish them by campaigning on those issues, drawing away conservatives upset by a Republican’s apostasy on economic freedom, for instance. The potential for this sanction should make the major parties govern in a more libertarian fashion than they would otherwise. If this is right, the adoption of IRV would result in less freedom….”

    – Jason Sorens, “The False Promise of Instant Runoff Voting”, Cato Unbound (9 December 2016)

    • Wow. Thanks for sharing that. I had not read the recent Cato pieces on “RCV” — just saw that a few were out.

      I say “wow” because, just maybe, the RCV activity is stimulating a conversation about whether the energy really should be behind PR.

      There is another set of problems to solve if people go with PR, separate from whatever harm might be done in enacting it. One problem is voter error. A second is coalition disloyalty in a fixed-term setting.

      Both problems are real. One disenfranchises voters. The other kills PR.

    • Tom, I checked the original piece. I disagree with its claims that IRV is inherently leftist or that it dupes third parties. (Both claims have a heavy approval-lobby flavor.) The leftism claim is particularly suspect, since the economic right tend to bankroll and vote for these kinds of reforms. At least based on what I’ve looked at.

      Still, my broad “wow” stands.

    • Libertarians live in a rather Aristotelian universe where observation of the real world is deprecated. Fortunately for this libertarian critique of the effects of AV Australia has absolutely no record of the election of independent or minor party MPs to AV assemblies.

      Equally there is no absolutely record of minority governments dependent on a minor party and independent crossbench ay the federal or state level. We know that no crossbench has ever achieved significant constitutional reforms. We know that the Australian house of representatives does not include 5 crossbenchers in a house of 150. We know that crossbenchers do not negotiate preference recommendations in return for policy and electoral concessions by the major parties. And as we all know the US congress has seen large numbers of crossbenchers elected to the US house of representatives who have repeatedly enjoyed the balance of power in that chamber.

      Or not…

      • It’s hard to tell from US experience because:

        1) Most current AV implementations are for nonpartisan races in single-party jurisdictions, where the “true” commitments of candidates and winners do not readily make themselves known;

        2) Information on who won under historic AV implementations is prohibitively costly to get outside of a well-funded project, as I learned in doing this for just three of the 24 STV cities.

        But there is the case of Burlington, VT, 2009, wherein the re-election of a Progressive Party mayor immediately preceded AV’s repeal.

        We get different stories about that repeal. Some say a scandal caused it. Others say it was the failure to elect the leader in first-preference votes. Still others (quite close to the community) say it was the unusual popularity of a “liberal” Republican, who happened to be the first-preference leader.

        My hunch is that much comes down to the dispersion of first-preference votes, then whatever unknown and potentially many factors determine voters’ rankings.

        I trust that your absolutely-noes are all in sarcasm. Say so if any are not, please.

    • You can still punish with IRV or RCV single-winner, just ask your supporters not to pick a 2nd place candidate…

      And, RCV single-winner alone isn’t good for political minorities, but if it grows third party alternatives to the 3 factions within the GOP then it may roil their ability to work together more effectively so that the new center right party has an incentive to push for RCV.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.